THE KATĀ'IB

A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF A LEBANESE POLITICAL PARTY

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C O N T E N T S

A B S T R A C T

The Katā'ib.
A Comprehensive Study of a Lebanese Political Party

The Katā'ib is Lebanon's most articulate nationalist group, and a study of it brings into focus most of the factors that have gone into the creation of the Lebanese Republic. Many of the same hopes and fears that gave rise to the Republic of Lebanon were present at the birth of the Katā'ib.

After a brief word on the geographical position of the Republic, this thesis outlines the history of the area. Beginning with the Phoenicians, the history is traced up to the present day. Special emphasis is given to the various religious groups and their relations with foreign powers. It becomes obvious, even after such a short study, that economically Lebanon's best interest lie in economic union with Syria. While all the forms of a republic exist, the spirit and cooperation necessary for a real republican government are lacking. Religious matters and sectarianism occupy a position, both in government and in the minds of the people, out of proportion to what might be expected.

The remainder of this dissertation is devoted to a study of the history, organisation and development of the Katā'ib. Founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel, it was for some years supported by funds from the French Government. Later

the Katā'ib and the French disagreed as to the methods whereby Lebanon could best achieve her independence. Nevertheless, there was never a deep seated dislike for France.

By 1947 development to a real political party status had been achieved, and the group began to play a more important role in Lebanese national life. Although still para-military in 1947, the "boy scout" element was more or less relegated to a back seat. The party boycotted the 1947 elections and at their conclusion joined the demand for new and free elections.

The Katā'ib is a doctrinary party and is very highly organized, however, at times the party discipline breaks down. In general its organization bears a strong resemblance to the government. The president of the party is omnipotent and all powerful. He has the power to appoint all party officials and dismiss them at will. Elias Rababy, Joseph Chader and Maurice Gemayel act as the president's unofficial advisors and are very powerful in party circles. The local and smallest unit of the party is the cell, whereas the largest unit of the party is the department. There are 12 of these departments. They are: Party Police, Finance, Discipline, Propaganda, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Regional, Youth, National Education, Laws, Imigration and Emigration. There is also a Women's Department, but it is not officially one of the 12. Each Department is entrusted with one phase of the work. Through its chain of command, the party can keep its fingers on the lives of its members.

In general we should consider the party to be a reform movement, but underlying all its reforms is an extreme and almost fanatical form of nationalism. This nationalism is based on the Katā'ib's own particular view of Lebanese History which emphasizes Lebanon's Phoenician ancestry and plays down, to the point of denying, Lebanon's Arab heritage. Using this as a base point, they have tried to develop the theory of a continuous national existence for what now constitutes the Lebanese Republic. The party is violently opposed to any sort of Arab unity or federation. At the basis of their fear of Arab unity is the question of religion. They feel that any Arab union will necessarily be Islamic as well. This fear of Islam underlies all of their activities and is the basis of their political thinking. While officially supporting the government during the Arab-Jewish War, some of the party members supported the Zionists and looked forward to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. They hoped that such a state would reduce the Moslem pressure on Lebanon.

On the constructive side, the Katā'ib stands for such things as: social security, reformed labor laws, universal military service, women suffrage, and development of local industry and introduction of new industries. They claim to be opposed to sectarianism and insist that the government should discard it as a basis for representation. However, if this is really the stand of the party then, they are attempting

to reduce the political power of the Christians, and this would, in the long run, make Lebanon more susceptible to inclusion in Syria.

The party is basically a middle class party, and most of its leaders were educated in French schools. This is just one reason why the Katā'ib has such a definite French hall-mark. Its fear of Islam and its belief that Great Britain supports Arab unity, have colored its attitude toward the British. They believe that if the British are pro-Arab they must be anti-Lebanese.

The Katā'ib is definitely pro-French. They are not the tool of France, but they feel that the French are Lebanon's best friends. This attitude finds its roots in the 1860 Druze-Maronite war and reaches as far back as the Crusades. They are greatful to France for having established "Grand Liban".

For Russia the party has only fear and hate. As a basically Maronite group they are under the discipline of the Roman Church, and as such can be depended on to be anti-Communist. Furthermore, the leaders of the party are bourgeois and have nothing to gain from the Russian system.

Towards the United States they have still another attitude. Since the U.S. has never publicly supported any pan-Arab movement and because so many Christian Lebanese now live in the United States, they hope that the American Government will adopt France's protective role toward Lebanon,

but divested of any desire for colonies. They believe that the large American investments and America's desire to keep the status-quo will be a factor in making the U.S. adopt such a protective policy toward Lebanon.

The Katā'ib finds its roots in two widely separated political schools: The French Revolution and the Fascist Revolution. The paraphenalia and the party organization find their proto-types in the governments of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany; however, the underlying philosophy of the party and of its leaders is that of the French Revolution. This group is not a revolutionary movement, it is nothing more than a reform party. It is not even, in the light of modern economics, a very radical movement. We can consider it to be a middle of the road conservative party.

Until the Katā'ib openly declares that it is a Christian movement, it will never capture the leadership of the Maronites. Until it becomes the strongest Maronite party, it will never be very powerful in the country.

NOTE: This thesis was written and completed before the April 1951 elections.

INTRODUCTION

In an area as vital to the world as the Middle East, all too little has been written about the internal politics of the various states. It is my hope that this study of the Katā'ib, one of Lebanon's leading nationalist movements, will, in its small way, help to fill that gap.

Beginning with an historical and geographical background of what now comprises the Lebanese Republic, this study goes on to a detailed study of the Katā'ib both with regard to its history and organization. The final chapters attempt to analyse its attitudes toward local and international problems.

Although the Lebanese Republic is the smallest and one of the newest of the states in the Arab World, and while the Katā'ib is certainly not a part of the larger political scene in the Arab East, nonetheless, a study of it, should in the long run, focus the attention of the student of Arab history and politics on the larger drama of Arab Unity.

CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

The position occupied by modern Lebanon astride the gateway to Syria and the interior has given her a political and economic importance far beyond what one would expect from such a tiny country.

Historically and geographically Lebanon is a part of the land mass usually referred to as Syria. However, the mountain regions along the Syrian coast have for centuries been known as the Lebanon or Mount Lebanon. It is this region that the Turks constituted as the sanjaq of Mount Lebanon. The exact borders of this area were never definitely determined, but it was assumed to include the mountain regions, excluding the coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre and Sidon as well as the Bakaa' valley and the region directly north of the Israel border.

In 1920 the political geography of the region changed. The French enlarged Mt. Lebanon to include all the territory from the borders of what is now Israel as far north as the Al Kabir River (Nahr al-Kabir) as well as the Bakaa' valley. This newly constituted state of "Grand Liban", now known as the Lebanese Republic, is believed to contain about one million one hundred and twenty six thousand people in an area of

three thousand four hundred and seventy six square miles, or just about the size of the state of Connecticut. The largest single group are the Maronites with 327,846, the Sunnis come next with about 235,595 followed by the Shīʿites who number around 209,338. The Greek Orthodox claim a membership of 109,000 while the Druzes have 74,000. The rest of the population is made up of Melkites, Armenians, Syriac Catholics, Jacobites, Latins and Protestants.(1)

The racial characteristics of the people who inhabit the Lebanese Republic are difficult to determine. The area has been subject to so many influxes of population that a typical Lebanese type is not easily classified. Certain generalizations can be made; the people are Semites, and anthropologists usually classify them as Armenoids;(2) their language for at least the last 1000 years has been Arabic and the general term 'Arab' can be applied to them.

In preparation of this thesis, I have used the term Lebanon or Lebanese Republic to refer to 'Grand Liban', whereas Mount Lebanon refers only to the Turkish Sanjaq.

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(1) Conseil Superieur des Interets Communs, Recueil de Statistiques de la Syrie et du Liban 1944 (Beirut, 1946), p. 25.

(2) W. B. Fisher, The Middle East, a Physical, Social and Regional Geography, (London, 1950), p. 86.

CHAPTER II

A SHORT HISTORY OF LEBANON

Although the coastal plane of Lebanon ranges in width from a few feet to several miles, this very small stretch of land has been one of the most sought after in the world. North of the capital city of Beirut, at a point where the Nahr al Kelb (Dog River) runs into the sea, is an historic record going back almost to the beginning of recorded history which graphically illustrates the strategic position of the Lebanese coast as a land bridge between the north and south. On the rock cliffs overlooking the sea are inscriptions placed there by most of the world's great conquerors. In language they range from Hieroglyphics and Cuneiform to French and English. All the armies passing that spot paused to add their names and record their exploits: Rameses II, Assarhaddon, Nebuchnezzar, Caracalla, Napoleon III, and Allenby, to mention just a few. The last plaque erected commemorates the evacuation of foreign troops from the Lebanon in 1946.

One of the first groups to enter the region were the Phoenicians who arrived sometime in the third millemium B.C. and settled along the coast where they set up a series of city states such as Sidon, Tyre and Byblos. One theory is that they migrated from the Persian Gulf[1] where according

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(1) George Rawlingson, History of Phoenesia, (London, 1895), p. 53.

to Strabo they left behind temples of great magnitude.[1] As the "Nahr al Kelb" inscriptions so graphically illustrate, the Phoenician coast has witnessed the hegemony of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Hittites, Persians, Greeks and Romans. All of these people left their mark on the area and each of them helped mold the people. Some like the Greeks built great cities filled with temples, the remains of which can still be seen. The Romans established a law school in Beirut which produced such outstanding men as Ulpion and Papinian. Thus, with the exception of the remote mountain fastnesses, the land became Hellenized. Greek became the language of the educated as well as the language of trade and industry. Even at that early date the people of the Levant were forced by circumstances to be bi-lingual.[2] During the Roman period, Christianity began to spread and Syria and the Phoenician coast were very early exposed to its teachings. The Christianity that established itself in Syria was Pauline rather than the Judistic Christianity of Peter. We know that Paul visited Tyre[3] on his missionary travels and it is possible that he spent some time wandering in Syria. His famous trip

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(1) De Lacy O'Leary, How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs, (London, 1948), p. 97.

(2) Syriac was the language of the people during that period and it continued to be spoken in isolated villages until very recently.

(3) Acts, 21: 3-7. cf. S.O.S. The Lebanon The Christian National Home in the Near East (n.d.), p. 9.

to Damascus is known to every Sunday School child.

From the time of Alexander the Great until the Arab conquest in 640, that is for more than a thousand years, the primary cultural force in Syria-Lebanon was Greek. This culture underwent modifications at the hands of the Seleucids, Ptolemiacs, Romans and Byzantines, but it always remained Hellenistic at its base. Underlying this was the ancient Aramaic culture and traditions.

In modern Lebanon there are three important non-Moslem communities, the Maronites, the Druzes and the Orthodox. The Maronites are the most important of these three. Some of the ancestors of the Maronites were inhabitants of Mount Lebanon before the advent of Christianity and during the seventh century their number was added to by a large number of Mardaites,[1] who came into Mt. Lebanon and adopted the religion of their neigubors. Before their break with the Eastern Church the Maronites were a part of the Orthodox community. During the seventh century this group adopted the Monothelite heresy which held that Christ possessed both a divine and human nature, but only a divine will. Originally this doctrine had been proposed by Sergius the Patriarch of Constantinople and supported by Emperor Heraclius as a compromise to heal the breach made by the Monophysite schism. Monotheletism was nothing more than a political protest dressed in

(1) P.K. Hitti, History of the Arabs. (London, 1949, 4th ed.), p. 205.

theological garb, and was later condemned by the Council of Constantinople in 680.[1] From the 12 century until their final union with the Roman Catholic Church in 1516 the Maronites had cordial relations with the Pope.[2] However, it was not until the later date that the Maronites began to bring their doctrines into conformity with Rome, and until very recently certain Monophysite practices flourished in the Maronite Church.

The Druzes first appeared as a group during the reign of the Fatimite Caliph Abu Ali Mansur Al Hakim (966 - 1020). The religion was brought to Mt. Lebanon by one of the Caliph's agents, Darazi,[3] (hence the name Druze, although the Druzes refer to themselves as Muwahhidūn, Unitarians). This religion is historically an offshoot of Shī'ism and particularly Ismā'īlism. Although a secret religion and actually anti-Moslem, it has been tolerated by Islam as one of its sects. It contains elements of Gnosticism, Manichaeism, Neo-Platonism and Christianity.[4] They believe that the Caliph Hakim was God incarnate.[5] On the death of Bahā'al-Dīn, the successor to Hamzah, the door to salvation was declared to have

(1) W.F. Adenay, The Greek & Eastern Churches. (N.Y.C., 1908), pp. 124-126.

(2) Keneth S. Latourette, Three Centuries of Advance. (N.Y.C., 1939), p. 80.

(3) Col. Charles Churchill, Druzes & Maronites (London, 1862), p. 11.

(4) P.K. Hitti, Origin of the Druze People & Religion. (New York, 1928), p. 69.

(5) Hakim was the Caliph who ordered the Church of the Holy Sepulchre destroyed.

been closed and further proselytzing was forbidden.[1] From that time on the only entrance to the Druze sect was by birth.[2]

The origin of the Druzes, unlike that of the Maronites, is difficult to determine. Hypotheses range all the way from Dr. Hitti's Persian theory and Dr. Oppenheim's Arab theory to Miss Bells's strange report of Japanese ancestry.[3] According to recent, and as yet unpublished research, done by Prof. Anis Frayha of the American University of Beirut, the Druzes are more or less indigenous to Lebanon. They were a community impregnated with Isma'ili doctrines which made their conversion to the teachings of Hamzah and Bahā'al-Dīn a simple matter.

Already in the fifth century signs of decay began to appear in the Byzantine Empire. The Council of Chalcedon opened the dykes of dissension among the people of the Empire and often the religious disputes were used as political scape. goats. The Church, one of the bulwarks of the state, became subject to attacks from the dissatisfied groups within it. Besides the internal factors working toward destruction of the state, external factors played an important role. The long series of Persian-Byzantine wars helped to bring estrange-

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(1) There have been exceptions to this rule. The Janbalats, who became the rulers of the Druzes, were taken into the faith as converts.

(2) Churchill, Druzes. p. 16.

(3) Hitti, Druzes. Ch. 4, also p. 14.

ment between the people of the area and the Empire. Geographical Syria was often the battle field for the Sassanids and the Greeks. Control of the region vassilated between the two Empires.

However the great religious and social revolution of Arabia was, in the long run, of more importance to geographic Syria than all the wars of the Byzantine period. Between 633 and 640 Syria was completely engulfed by the Moslems. The new religo-social force of Islam, in time, changed the face of the land. In its train it brought to the area a new language, a religion, and a social system. We must not carry this too far since the Lebanese Christians were recognized as "Dhimmis" (i.e. People of the Book) and as such were allowed freedom of worship, subject to some regulations and the payment of the "Jizyah" (tribute). Since they were not subject to Moslem law, they were exempted from military service, which forbade non-Moslems from fighting in the army. Islam did not destroy the Christian communities; in fact it raised the position of the Church to a semi-governmental organization. The Patriarchs, as heads of their respective communities, became the defacto rulers of the Christians in Mount Lebanon. In addition to the "Jizyah", the Christians were expected to pay the "Kharāj" (land tax).(1) In return for payment of taxes,

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(1) The land tax was also paid by the Moslems as well as by the protected people.

Islam promised the Christians the same protection that it offered to the Moslems.[1]

With the exception of the Mardaite rebellion in 666,[2] Mount Lebanon played a very meager part in the politics of the Umayyad and Abbasid Empires; although Syrian and Lebanese Christians were often in positions of great power during the early days of the Umayyad Caliphate.[3] Syrio-Lebanese ascendency ended with the removal of the capital from Damascus to Baghdad (750). Mt. Lebanon being far from the center of the Abbasid Empire lost what little political significance it might have had. Although she played a small role in the political intrigues of the day, the Mountains became famous as a refuge for minority groups and oppressed peoples. Both Christians and Moslems heresiarchs found security in the mountain fastness. There they were able to carry on a community life safe from intrusion or surveillance.

By the tenth century Mt. Lebanon had among its inhabitants Maronites, Druzes, Greek Orthodox, Shīʿis and Sunnis. The Crusaders brought with them still another sect, the

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(1) Hitti, Arabs, p. 170.

(2) Ibid, p. 205. "Mu'awiyah agreed to the payment of a heavy annual tribute to the Byzantine Emperor in consideration of his withdrawal of support from this internal enemy, to whom he also agreed to pay a tax".

(3) Ibid, p. 246. Mansur Ibn-Srjun, the grandfather of St. John of Damascus, was the financial administrator for Mu'awiyah. St. John himself was Caliph Yazid's boon companion.

Latins,[1] but they have never been very large or powerful.[2] The larger groups received a continual flow of new blood brought by individuals and families who fled to the mountains to escape persecution, creditors, or family feuds. Thus Mount Lebanon developed into a sanctuary known throughout the length and breadth of the land. As such she developed traditions of autonomy, feudalism and religious tolerance.[3] the seeds of which must have been present in pre-Crusader Lebanon. No group in Mt. Lebanon was sufficiently large to become the ruling majority, the result of this was the tolerant spirit, Dr. Hourani speaks about, and a "laisser faire" attitude toward their neighbors.

Because of the vast difference in culture between the Crusaders and themselves, the local population found the Franks barbaric and crude. One can almost liken the Crusades to the Barbarian invasions of Europe; so great was the cultural gap between the two groups.

Coming in the 'Name of Christ, the Prince of Peace', the Crusaders wrought havoc and destruction where ever they went. The country to which they came presented a "spectacle of division and impotence",[4] especially was this true of

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(1) A.H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, (Oxford, 1947), pp. 63-74.

(2) Today they number less than 4,000.

(3) Ibid. p. 69.

(4) Hitti, Arabs, p. 633.

Lebanon. The area was divided between princes and feudal lords each of whom professed different political loyalties. The cohesive force of a national religion did not exist, for the Lebanese, were then as now, divided. Each of the major religious communities carried on a life very much separated from any other community. Even in the 20th century it is not strange for villages to have a completely separate existence. Villagers living, no more than a quarter of a mile apart, may have no more social intercourse with another village than an occasional visit. So much more so, must have been the isolation of villages at the beginning of the 11th century. Not only was the Lebanon divided, but Syria as well. Preceding the Crusades, Syria was divided into a number of small Saljuq states which were more or less continually at war with each other. Into such a political boiling pot, the Crusaders marched. It is of little wonder, therefore, that in the initial stages, the Crusaders were successful.[1]

> The Crusades were "... the medieval chapter in the long story of interaction between East and West, of which the Trojan and Persian wars of antiquity form the prelude and the imperialistic expansion of modern Western Europe the latest chapter ... the Crusades represent the reaction of Christian Europe against the Moslem Asia..."[2]

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(1) W.B. Stevenson, Crusades in the East. (Cambridge, 1907), p. 1.

(2) Hitti, Arabs. p. 635-6.

Indeed the Crusades were all that, but in particular they were the beginning of what the French choose to call their 'historic interests in the Levant', unless we accept the tradition that Charlemagne received the Keys of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in 800[1] as the beginning of that interest. In the last year of the 11th century the Crusading armies marched down the Syrian coast toward Jerusalem. In their initial drive toward Jerusalem, they did not tarry long on the Syrian coast. We are told that they simply "gazed with interest on the ancient walls of the Phoenician towns"[2] not stopping to invest them. A segment of the Lebanese population, the Maronites, were very early sympathetic toward the Crusaders, meeting them some place near Tripoli[3] where they offered their services as guides. No doubt the Maronites looked to the Crusaders as deliverers from their Moslem overlords. What today constitutes the Lebanese Republic was not conquered by the Crusaders until about 1124. Tyre capitulated to Baldwin in June of that year, Sidon and Beirut were captured in 1110. Tripoli held out for some time but was finally taken by Baldwin, and in time became the seat of the Counts of Tripoli. By 1111 most of Lebanon was in the hands of the Crusaders with the exception of Tyre, which although paying

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(1) Einar Joranson, American Historical Review, Vol. XXXII (1927), pp. 241-61; Hitti, Arabs, p. 298: he seems to feel that this is a mere fable.

(2) Stevenson, p. 33.

(3) Peter Sfeir, Language of Christ in America. (Buffalo, 1929), p. 17.

tribute was not an integral part of the Latin Kingdom. Finally in 1124, just 25 years after the first Crusaders set foot in Lebanon and had first seen the 'ancient Phoenician walls' the country was in their possession.[1] Lebanon was divided between two of the Latin states: from the Dog River south, it was a part of the Kingdom of Jerusalem; north Lebanon formed a part of the County of Tripoli. The political history of the area during that period is the history of the Latin Kingdoms.

More important for our study is the response of the two peoples toward each other. The Crusades were the first great impact of west on east since the days of the Romans, and as Dr. Hitti says, as we have already noted, it was simply the continuation of a trend that is even today in operation. The Crusaders found that the people they had come to civilize and Christianize were actually more advanced than themselves. They discovered that Arab dress and customs were better adapted to that part of the world, and in a generation the Lords of the Latin Kingdom had adopted a great many of the customs of the country.[2] Many of them married local women and their sons and their son's sons completely identified themselves with their adopted land. Those who returned

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(1) Certain sections of the Bakaa' were never held by the Crusaders.

(2) P.K. Hitti, <u>An Arab Syrian Gentleman and Warrior</u>, (New York City, 1929), Ch. 8.

to Europe carried with them, not only the produce of the East, but a modified and more liberal conception of Islam. However, it was in the Lebanon, where the Crusader influence was most greatly felt, because: (a) the Lebanon was directly ruled by the Crusaders, and (b) and this is very important, because the Maronites looked to the Franks as their protectors. The Crusaders were very impressed with the war-like qualities of the Christian natives and recruited them into their armies.[(1)] During the 12th century the Maronite Church began to accept the suzerainty of Rome, a step which no doubt was facilitated by the presence of the Crusading armies and the Latin priests that followed in its train. The letter which St. Louis IX wrote to the Maronite Patriarch gives an excellent insight into the relations that existed between the French and the Maronites. The letter says in part,

> "Our hearts were filled with gladness when we saw your son Simon leading 25,000 men coming to meet us in your name, bringing us the expression of your feelings and offering gifts besides the fine horses which you have sent us. Indeed the friendship that we began to feel with so much ardor toward the Maronites during our sojourn in Cyprus, where they are established, has grown more and more".[(2)]

The king goes on to say that he considers the Maronites to be a part of the French nation and that France will give them the same protection that she gives to Frenchmen.

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(1) D.C. Munro, Kingdom of the Crusaders. (N.Y.C., 1935), p. 11.

(2) Baron De Testa, Recueil des Traites de L'Empire Ottoman. Tome III (Paris, 1866), p. 140.

The Maronites were only a small segment of the Arab world and so in due course the overwhelming pressure of Islam pushed the Crusaders out of the East. The fall of Acre in 1291 sealed the fate of Tyre, Sidon and Beirut. Tripoli was the last of the Crusader towns to hold out and even Tripoli's resistance was half-hearted.[1] Even though the political domination of Lebanon by the Francs had ended, their mark was left on the country. The Crusaders had mixed freely with the local population. The results of this can be seen in the numerous Lebanese names of Crusader origin, to wit - Duwayhi, Franjiyyah, Sawaya and Bardawil.[2] What is more important, the idea that Lebanon was an area for French influence was established in the imagination of the French people. In like fashion the Maronites began to think in terms of 'Mother France', and to look toward France as their natural protector. Following the Crusades, Lebanon entered on a period of sharp decline and for the next two centuries she was ruled by the Mamluks, whose rule was occasionally interrupted by invasions. The large scale invasions, such as that of Tīmūr did not penetrate into the mountains, but their effects were generally felt. At the same time Mt. Lebanon was suffering from internal troubles which in the 13th century caused the Druze and

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(1) Stevenson, p. 355.

(2) Duwayhi is arabized De Duney. Bardawil means Baldwin, Sawaya comes from De Savoy. Franjiyyah is a term in the local dialect meaning foreigner or actually Franks. One of Foreign ministers of Lebanon was named Franjiyah.

Shi'its revolts. Because of the constant wars, the heavy taxation, and above all the discovery of new trade routes to the orient, the Lebanon and Syria were faced by a severe economic depression.[1] Added to this there was a great decrease in population. These conditions made the Ottoman conquest of the area in 1517 very easy, and they fell to the Turks as a part of their conquest of the Mamluk empire. The Ottomans continued the feudal organization of the Lebanon and Sultan Salim I appointed an Amir of the Ma'n family ruler of a large portion of Mt. Lebanon. The greatest ruler of this family was Fakhr ad-Dīn II who governed Mt. Lebanon and a large part of Syria. His possessions reached from Antioch as far south as Acre.[2] Fakhr ad-Dīn proved to be a thorn in the side of the Turks. In 1633 he allied himself with the Kurdish house of Janbalat and harrassed his masters who were then engaged in a war with Persia.[3] He became so independent that he signed a treaty of alliance with Duke Ferdinand I of Tuscany. He was most liberal in his dealing with foreigners and allowed missionaries to enter his domain. After the Turks bombarded Beirut in 1633, he fled to Leghorn while his sons Ali and Yūnis ruled the Lebanon.[4] On his return to Lebanon in 1618

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(1) A.H. Hourani, Syria & Lebanon, (Oxford, 1946), p. 24.

(2) Frayha's notes, pp. 97-98.

(3) Carl Brockleman, History of the Islamic Peoples, tr. J. Carmichael and M. Perlmann (N.Y.C., 1947), p. 331.

(4) P.K. Hitti, History of Syria, (London, 1951), p. 681.

the great Prince again locked horns with the Turks who two years later defeated and sent him to Istanbul where he was beheaded.[1]

In 1535 France and the Ottoman Empire signed a treaty of 'Peace Amity and Commerce' which became the prototype of all the treaties of capitulation. France and Turkey signed four other treaties of the same nature; the last one in 1673 renewed all the privileges and also made the Capitulatory reign permanent.[2] The capitulations, which gave France the right to protect her subjects in Ottoman lands, were soon extended to mean the right to protect her co-religionists as well. Thus by 1860 we find Churchill reporting that Lebanese monasteries were flying the French flag and many Maronites were claiming protection as French subjects. Nor was France the only nation to receive such privileges; Russia, after the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774), became the protector of the Orthodox Christians. Before the system of Capitulations was brought to a close, 16 countries were included.[3] Because

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(1) Michel Chebli, Fakhreddine II Maan, (Beirut, 1946), p. 188. The date of his death is given as either April 13 or March 14, 1635.

(2) Nasim Sousa, The Capitulation Regime of Turkey, (Baltimore 1933), p. 68. For complete text of Capitulations, see A. Schopoff, Les Reformes et la Protection des Chretiens en Turquie, (Paris, 1904), pp. 1, 5, 9, and 12.

(3) They were: France, USA, Great Britain, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Sicily, Prussia, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, the Hansa cities, Greece, Brazil and Bavaria.

of the Capitulations, France and Great Britain were able to force the Porte in 1860 to allow the landing of Troops in Beirut for protection of the Christians. The last Ma'n to rule the Lebanon was Fakhr ad-Dīn II. His successors were the Shihābis, a Moslem family,[1] who held sway in Mt. Lebanon for 100 years.[2]

During the 18th century the Maronites began moving southward settling in areas where the Druzes were in a majority. This same century was a time of internecine warfare between the different Druze factions, some of the defeated families immigrated to Jebel Druze in Syria.

Jazzār Pasha, the Turkish governor of Acre, gradually gained control of the feudal lands of Lebanon and from 1775 until 1804[3] he was its real ruler. The French bid for Syria came to ruin at Acre in 1779, nonetheless the Maronites of Lebanon were in contact with Napoleon's army and were very pro-French.[4]

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(1) In 1756 two Shihābis were converted to Christianity and according to Col. Churchill this was one of the contributing factors in the 1860 Massacre.

(2) Col. Charles Churchill, Mount Lebanon. (London, 1853), Vol. 1, p. 133.

(3) Hourani, Syria. pp. 23-25.

(4) According to George Antonius, the French invasion was the beginning of the Arab awakening, which was stimulated by the various foreign schools in Lebanon. Catholic missionaries began a series of schools, the best known being that of Aintura, which the Jesuits later moved to Beirut where it became the Université St. Joseph. American missionaries

Under Amir Bashir Al Shihābi, a crypto-Christian, Lebanon enjoyed peace and prosperity from 1789 to 1804. During his rule of the mountain, he developed relations with European powers and tried to stimulate trade. Under his rule the population increased both by natural means and immigration. Although almost illiterate himself, he encouraged the founding of schools and the education of his people.[1] Even today folk tales recall his reign as severe yet just.

When Ibrahim Pasha came to the Lebanon, Bashir allied himself with the great Egyptian leader. For nine years the Egyptians ruled, and in general, they had a good effect on the area. They encouraged foreign missionaries and educators;[2] they tried to stimulate local industry and even opened coal pits near Beirut.[3] Mainly because of the pressure brought to bear on the Porte by England and Russia, Ibrahim pasha was ordered out of the region in 1831. When Ibrahim Pasha defeated the Sultan's troops at Nizib the British together with Austria landed troops at Junieh.[4] At the same time the British were

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opened work in Beirut in 1820. They operated a printing press and a large number of schools. Although never a part of the mission the Syrian Protestant College (American University of Beirut) was a part of the general educational movement, and to it Arab nationalism owes a great deal. Many Arab leaders were trained there.

(1) Kutchuk Effendi, <u>L'Emir Bechir</u>. (n.d.), pp. 1-16.

(2) George Antonius, <u>The Arab Awakening</u>. (London, 1945), 1st Ed. reprint, p. 39.

(3) J.L. Farley, <u>Two Years in Syria</u>. (London, 1859), p. 25.

(4) Freyha's unpublished notes on the Druzes, p. 105.

supplying the Lebanese with arms who were soon in revolt. For his aid to the Egyptians, Amir Bashir was exiled to Malta, where he remained for 20 years. During these years Lebanon was in a state of anarchy; the Turks, now in complete control of Lebanon, imposed heavy taxes, sold public offices to the highest bidder and did their best to destroy the peace of the mountain by setting group against group. The Turkish appointed ruler, Amir Bashir Kassim proved incapable of the job; his high-handed policy was extremely unpopular. During his rule, the Maronite clergy engaged in activities which were destined to create civil war.[1] France, meanwhile, was busy arming the Maronites.[2] who were becoming more and more unsatisfied with the situation. The British, jockeying for position, were intriguing with the Druses. This culminated in the rising of 1841-42 in which the Christians were badly defeated -- much to the dismay of the Maronite Patriarch, who was one of the prime instigators of the revolt.[3] The Turks tried to settle the problem by appointing Omar Pasha as governor, a position he held for less than a year. By this time the whole system of direct Turkish rule had broken down; the Turks, under

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(1) Churchill, Druzes & Maronites, p. 38-9. See discussion of the document issued by the Patriarch with view of depriving Druze Sheikhs of their power.

(2) Ibid. p. 40. The author claims that France gave the Maronites 20 thousand sterling pounds.

(3) Ibid. p. 42-55.

pressure from home and abroad, agreed to a system whereby the Maronites and Druzes of Mt. Lebanon should have separate governors. The new system worked uneasily until 1845 when another revolt broke out.

> "During the next few years social and religious tension continued to increase ... finally in 1857 matters came to a head in the purely Maronite districts of North Lebanon where the peasants revolted against their Lords. Led by Priests and younger sons of landowning families and popular leaders of whom the most notable was Yusuf Karam, they established a peasant government".(1)

The "Hatti Humayoun Sharif"(2) issued by the Sultan on February 18, 1856,(3) declared all Ottoman subjects equal in rights, regardless of religion or race. In addition to this, it confirmed the rights and privileges granted in the Hatti Sharif of Gulhane.(4) Europe with its naive belief in the

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(1) Hourani, Syria. p. 32.

(2) De Testa, p. 132-3.
Hatti Humayoun Sharif. selected section. Les garanties promise de notre part à tous les sujets de mon Empire par le Hatti Humayoun de Gul-Hané et en conformité du Tanzimat, sans distinction de classe ni de cultes, pour la securité de leurs personnes et de leur biens et pour le conservation de leur honneur, sont aujourd'hui confirmees et consolidées, et pour qu'elles reçoivent leur plein et entier effet, des mesures efficaces seront prise. Tous les privileges ou immunites spirituel accordés, ab antiquo de la part de mes ancêtres et à des dates postérieures, à toutes les communautés chrétiennes ou d'autre rites non-musulmans établis dans mon Empire sous mon égide protectrice, seront confirmés et maintenus.

(3) Brockleman, p. 367. Sets the date as the 1st of Feb.1856.

(4) Gabriel E. Noradounghian, Recueil d'Acts Internationaux de L'Empire Ottoman. TomeIII, (Paris, 1902), pp. 84-5.

sanctity of law, believed, that by forcing this reform on the Porte, it could solve the problem of the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. The Hatti Sharif also made Christians liable for military service, however they could hire a proxy.

By 1859 tension had reached such a state that only an incident was needed to throw the whole of Mt. Lebanon into civil war. This was found in a fight between two small boys that grew into a village "free for all" and at last into civil war.(1) The Druzes, with the tacit approval of the Turks, attacked the Christians killing several thousands of them and destroying such villages as Deir el Kamar, Mukhtara, Zahley, etc. The massacre so excited the sympathies of Europe that the powers had to intervene, and Napoleon III sent a military expedition to Lebanon. Following the troubles, an international commission met in Beirut(2) to find a solution to the problem. This commission finally moved to Istanbul where it completed its hearings and established Mt. Lebanon as an autonomous state to be governed by a Christian appointed by the Sultan and approved by the Commission. The governor of Mt. Lebanon was to be assisted by a council of representatives from the different sects. Feudal privileges of the great

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(1) Churchill, Druzes and Maronites. p. 132.

(2) Represented on the commission were, France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia and Turkey.

families were abolished.[1] Thus from 1864, the date of ratification of Lebanese autonomy, until World War I, the Lebanese enjoyed a regime of good government. This was a period of great activity on the part of the missionary societies, both Catholic and Protestant. Many schools and hospitals were opened. Mt. Lebanon prospered and its population increased. The widened horizons of the Lebanese and the population pressure caused a large number of them to emigrate to the Americas and Africa. The contact with the New World that Lebanon got through its emigrants in the United States was another of the stimuli that helped cause the Arab revolt.

By 1914 Mt. Lebanon (including Beirut) was one of the most westernized of all the Arab lands although not Europeanized enough to be western, but too westernized to be comfortable in an oriental society.

War conditions caused the Turks to place Mt. Lebanon under direct Turkish rule in October 1915. Although their rule was hard and corrupt, things went along normally considering war conditions for about a year. Inflation, however, cut deeply into the peoples income. The following years were different, and by 1917 most of the population faced starvation. It was by no means an uncommon sight to see the dead lying unburried in the streets.[2]

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(1) I. Abcarius, The Turmoil in Lebanon, tr. J.F. Scheltema (New Haven, 1920), pp. 169-70.

(2) Conversations the author had with Mr. George Stewart, for

Both British and French agents were trying to cause a revolt in the Lebanon, while never completely successful a number of Lebanese were involved. Yusuf Hayek, a Maronite priest, was hung for his activities on the behalf of France. In August of 1915, Jamal Pasha, had a large number of the Syrian and Lebanese collaborators tried at Aley; 13 of whom were sentenced to be hung, 45 were sentenced in absentia and a large number were given prison terms. Of the 13 condemned only ten were executed. The other three were given prison terms. In 1916, 21 more were hung -- 14 in Beirut and 7 in Damascus.[1]

The fall of Damascus and the occupation of Beirut by British land and French sea forces marked the end of Turkish rule in Lebanon. The French had been promised Syria and Lebanon by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of October, 1915.[2] Mt. Lebanon, always pro-French, was content with this arrangement, however the coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre were not at all satisfied. When the Turks left, Omar Daouk took over the duties of Mayor of Beirut and on October 6th 1918 he recognized Shukri Ayoubi Pasha, representative of the

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43 years a resident of Beirut, and long time treasurer of the American University of Beirut; c.f. S.B.L. Penrose, That They May Have Life. (N.Y.C., 1941), p. 173.

(1) Antonius, pp. 187-189.

(2) H.H. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry in the Post War Near East. (London, 1938), pp. 23-32; contains a complete discussion of the agreement.

Arab Government of Damascus as Governor of Beirut and Mt. Lebanon. Six days later Shukri Ayoubi Pasha appointed Habib Pasha SA'd civil governor of the two districts.[1] However, this regime was short lived and the French were soon in complete control. On April 25, 1920, the San Remo Conference awarded Syria and Lebanon to France as a class A mandate. In order to increase their effective control of the region, the French enlarged Mt. Lebanon, creating 'Grand Liban', which included all the coastal cities, the Bakaa' and the land between Mt. Lebanon and the Palestine border. By so doing they hoped to weaken the nationalist movement in Syria and make Lebanon a more self contained unit. This move was greatly disapproved of by the predominantly Moslem cities of the coast which felt more akin to Syria than to the Christian mountain. Although the French rule was very bad in both Syria and Lebanon, Lebanon was relatively quiet during the first few years whereas in Syria there were constant uprisings, the most serious being that of the Druzes in 1925.[2] Such incidents were factors that hastened the French into granting constitutional government to Lebanon. The French could not afford to have the Lebanese become anti-French. Thus in 1926 Mr. Henry de Jouvenil proclaimed the creation of

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(1) Amin Saīd, <u>Al Thawrah al ʿArabīyah al Kubra</u>. (Cairo, n.d.), vol. II, p. II.

(2) Antonius, p. 377.

the Lebanese Republic. A constitution was duly written and a president elected by the new national assembly. The constitution was a gift from the French, as the Lebanese had very little to do with its formulation.[1] The legislature was bicameral, the Senate was appointed by the High Commissioner and the Chamber elected by the people. Seats in this new Chamber were apportioned on the basis of religious sects. On May 26, 1926, Charles Dabbas was elected by the Legislature as the first President of the Republic. The new Republic proved to be nothing more than a facade for continued French rule since all important powers remained in the hands of the French High Commissioner and the various advisors in the departments of the Government. Due to the high cost of its operation the High Commissioner suspended the Constitution in 1932. For a period, until 1934, the High Commissioner ruled the country directly. In order to placate the growing unrest in Lebanon, the French appointed Habib Pasha al-Sa'ad, President, for a term beginning in 1934. Nonetheless political conditions worsened until the French decided in 1936 to negotiate a treaty giving Lebanon a certain degree of independence.

1936 also marked a change in French policy in the Levant. The new government of Leon Blum was socialist and

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(1) Haddad, Fifty Years of Modern Syria and Lebanon. (Beirut. 1950), p. 78.

as such had a less imperial outlook than its predecessors. A treaty was promptly signed by Comte de Martel, the High Commissioner, and the Lebanese on November 13, 1936. The treaty offered Lebanon independence and replaced the mandate by a Franco-Lebanese treaty of alliance. This treaty provided for free use of Lebanese territory by the French as regards stationing of troops and free use of her ports. In return France promised to propose the Lebanon for League membership, and to provide her with military support if she were attacked. This alliance was to remain in force for a 25 year period and was to come into effect within three years after signature.[1] Such a treaty was hardly a declaration of independence, but the tennor of the times were such that the Lebanese ratified the agreement; although the Moslem elements were opposed to it.[2] The provision for unrestricted use of Lebanon by the French Army was designed to safeguard French interests in the Arab world and especially to maintain what France termed her 'historic interests'. The fall of the Blum Government ended any hope of French ratification and the matter became a dead letter. By 1937 the old constitution had been re-established and a new electoral law put into effect. The new law called for an enlarged Chamber 2/3rds elected on the

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(1) Antonius, p. 384.

(2) Abouchedid, Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria, Part I, (Beirut, 1947), p. 58.

basis of religion and 1/3 nominated. Again the new move seemed to the Lebanese as simply another way for the French to maintain and even increase their power.

Until the beginning of World War II in 1939, the new parliament did little of lasting importance. Local newspapers carried on a continuous campaign against the parliament and the successive cabinets of Amir Khalid Shihab, Abdullah al Yafi and Al Ahdab. The prestige of both the French and the local governments reached a new low.

The war opened a new period of Lebanese history. Most Lebanese Christians were sympathetic to the allied powers, but a noisy minority of Moslems as well as some Christians were pro-axis; these groups hoped that a German victory would bring an end to French rule in Lebanon, the feeling being that: 'the devil you don't know is better than the one you know'.[1] With the fall of France in 1940, the Vichy Government took control of the mandates and General Dentz became the High Commissioner.

German infiltration, in the guise of tourists and technicians, reached a peak at the time of the fall of Crete.[2] Had not the British and Free French begun their occupation, the Germans may well have taken complete control of Lebanon.

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(1) Conversations with Mr. George Stewart. American Christian Palestine Committee. The Arab War Effort. (N.Y.C., 1948), p. 7.

(2) Conversations with Mr. George Stewart.

The war in Lebanon was of short duration, lasting just under a month. By the 13th of July 1941 all of Lebanon and Syria were in Allied hands. The only battle of importance was fought at the Damour River. A month before the actual occupation General Catroux, of the Free French, proclaimed the independence of Syria; however, it was not until November 26th, 1941, that a similar declaration was made in regard to Lebanon.(1) Republican forms were soon set in operation and Alfred Naccache was made President of the Republic. Great Britain, Free France, the U.S.A. and Russia were quick to recognize the new Lebanese Republic.(2) Independence proved to be an empty word for Lebanon, the Free French were very slow in turning over to the Lebanese government the powers which would make it a sovereign state. Finally in March, General Catroux appointed Dr. Ayyoub Tabit, Chief of State, in charge of supervising elections and with the power to rule by decree until the elections could be held. The elections held in August chose a parliament composed of 30 Christians and 25 Moslems.(3) When Parliament convened in September, it chose Shaikh Beshara el Khury, leader of the Constitutional Bloc, as President.

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(1) Collection of handbills and clippings in the American University of Beirut Library. (Independence folio).

(2) The United States recognized Lebanon in October 1942, Britain did so in December.

(3) Mr. Helleau was at this time the High Commissioner with the title of Delegate General. The division of seats between religious sects was an apportionment made by law.

Emile Edde, leader of the National Bloc and the French supported candidate, was defeated. The new Prime Minister, Riad al Solh was a nationalist and a long time supporter of Lebanese independence. He set about to cut the last political ties that bound Lebanon to France. The Prime Minister introduced into the Chamber a bill intending to abolish the "Special Rights" of France and to make Arabic the only official language. The French declared that Lebanon could not abolish such privileges because they were granted by the League of Nations and that any unilateral action on the part of Lebanon was invalid.[1] The Lebanese Government refused to discuss the matter; so the High Commissioner had the President and cabinet, with 2 exceptions, placed under arrest. The French appointed Emile Eddé, a former president, to the presidency and he tried without success to form a government. This action was viewed with alarm by both the United States and Great Britain. General Spears, the British Minister, on orders from his government, brought strong pressure to bear, and forced the French authorities to release the President and his cabinet. After 11 days of confinement the Government returned to Beirut and the hated 'reserved powers of France' were abolished.[2] This

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(1) Abouchedid, Part I, pp. 108-131. (The author owes a great deal to Miss Abouchedid's complete collection of newspaper and radio reports of this period of Lebanese history.)

(2) See collection of news articles: American University of Beirut, Independence folio; diary kept by "Richard".

incident marked the beginning of the end of French political power in the Levant and had a detrimental effect on French hegemony in the whole Middle East. As soon as the Lebanese government was reinstalled, M. Helleau, the Delegate General, left for Algiers.

With the exception of the Chasseurs Libanaises, the French trained Lebanese Army, most government functions were in the hands of the national government by January of 1944. It soon became evident that the French were determined to keep their control of the "Chasseurs" as long as possible. The Army question and the statements General de Gaulle made to the press concerning the necessity of maintaining French troops in Lebanon, created a great deal of tension in the country. De Gaulle's attempt to get Lebanon to sign a treaty guaranteeing France's cultural and economic interests plus the right to station troops and naval forces in the Lebanon[1] caused a series of riots in Beirut and other Lebanese cities.

On the other hand, Lebanese sovereignty was strengthened by a series of diplomatic moves. Her declaration of war on Germany (February 26, 1945) and her signature of the United Nation's Pact in April of the same year, were actually a restatement of her independence. The year before (October 7, 1944), Lebanon had agreed to the Protocol of Alexandria.[2]

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(1) Haddad, p. 97.

(2) The Protocol of Alexandria laid the foundation for the Arab League.

Because of the Maronites, who feared the absorbtion of Lebanon by her neighbours, the protocol recognized her 'special position'. With this safeguard, Lebanon signed the Covenant of the Arab League on March 22, 1945.(1) These moves gave force to the belief that Lebanon wished to maintain her independence and gave her the moral support of the Arab world: thus, when the French pressed for signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty in May of 1945, she in conjunction with Syria was able to refuse. During the negotiations over the French demands for an alliance, additional French troops began to arrive from Senegal. On May 29th 1945 the French tried to bludgeon the Lebanese and Syrians into signing the treaty by bombarding Damascus. This act focussed the World's attention on the Levant, and again Britain and the United States had to bring pressure on the French.(2) The incident took place while the United Nations Charter was being drafted, and so brought the whole problem of Syria and Lebanon to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations. At the London meeting of the U.N. in 1945 it was decided to evacuate all foreign troops from both Syria and Lebanon. Thus on December 31, 1946, the last foreign troops left, and Lebanon for the first time in history was a completely independent state..

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(1) Haddad, p. 91.

(2) Abouchedid, Part III, p. 69.

Political history since Evacuation Day has been that of trial and error. The four major issues that the country has had to face have been: a) the elections of 1947, b) the Arab-Israel War, c) Relations with Syria, and d) Lebanon's place in the East-West conflict.

The 1947 elections were marked by demonstrations and near-rebellion; they were as fraudulent as any elections could possibly be.[1] The government party (Constitutional Bloc) re-elected itself and the following year amended the constitution to allow the president to succeed himself for another six-year term.

The outbreak of the war in Palestine on May 14, 1950 also caused the government a great deal of embarrassment. Lebanon, which has contiguous borders with Israel, was in no condition to fight a token war. As matters proved, she was not even able to defend herself from Jewish invasions. Furthermore, a segment of the Maronites lead by the Patriarch Arida had in 1945 proposed Palestine as a Jewish state, and called for the creation of Lebanon as a Christian state.[2] The whole Palestine problem reflected Lebanon's uncertain position in the Arab World. Not to aid the Arabs would be an act of bad faith and would possibly have brought reprisals;

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(1) Akl G, Quadata A, Huneine E, Tr. Black Book of Lebanese Elections of May 25, 1947. (New York, 1947), pp. 16-26.

(2) S.O.S., The Lebanon the Christian National Home in the Near East. (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 5, 36-39.

to aid the other Arab states could have brought about real Arab Unity, an eventuality that the Lebanon fears. As far as Lebanon was concerned, the problem resolved itself with the Zionist victory. The Arabs were not united by a common enemy: in fact, the war sharpened the differences between them.

Actually the Israeli victory has left the Lebanon in a very critical position. If Israel should expand, Lebanon is one of the states into which such an expansion might press. Furthermore, an industralised Israel, provided she could trade with the Arab states, will undermine Lebanon's commercial hegemony among her Arab neighbours. Israel may in the future be able to produce and export to the Arabs the same goods that are now imported from abroad via Lebanon.

Relations with Syria, a very important subject considering the bonds between the two countries and the geographical position of Lebanon in relation to Syria, have deteriorated. The problem of 'the Common Interests' was a hangover from the days of the mandate and was one of the major problems facing Lebanon and Syria. Until March 14, 1950, the two sister republics operated jointly the customs department, control of concessions, antiquities, the patent office, social affairs service, excise department, maritime trade, posts and telegraphs, veterinary service, survey department, gunpowder monopoly, arms licences and the Sûreté Générale:[1] these were

(1) Abouchedid, Part II, p. 205.

known as the 'Common Interests'. The Syrians, in trying to develop their industry, felt that the system of tariffs was inadequate for protection of their infant industries. Lebanon on the other hand refused to raise the tarifis, since a good part of her national income stemmed from her role as middle man and an entrepot for the Middle East. This, as well as other important questions, such as Lebanon's fear of Moslem Syria, led to the dissolution of the customs union and brought to an end the whole regime of Common Interests.

The economy of Lebanon depends on six factors: remittances from emigrants, channeling imports and exports to and from the Arab hinterland, tourist trade, fruit exports, acting as a clearing house for international finance and trade, and an illegal trade in Hasheesh.(1) An economy based on such a foundation tends to be chaotic and unstable. Thus the economic break with Syria is a very serious question for the Lebanon. As I write this, less than a year after the rupture of the customs union, the Lebanese are faced with an economic crisis. The Lebanese pound, which for some time had been as much as 20% greater in value than the Syrian, has now fallen to about 3% below that of Syria.(2) Prices for staples

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(1) Figures on Hasheesh are impossible to find, but I have personally seen large areas of the drug under cultivation in northern Lebanon. Most of it is smuggled to Egypt, where there is a good market for it.

(2) Inquiries made by the author in the Lebanese free market on December 4, 1950.

are higher in Lebanon than in Syria, and the merchants of Beirut are suffering an appreciable loss in trade. Some merchants report as much as a 40% decrease in sales. What is even more disastrous from the point of view of Lebanon, is that the Syrians are beginning to take steps to develop more fully their port at Lattakia. If and when it is completed, it will mean a tremendous loss in trade for Beirut and Lebanon. It seems fairly obvious to the author that Lebanese economic independence means eventual bankruptcy.

On the domestic political front, the government had to face the problems raised by the "Partie Populaire Syrienne".[1] In May 1949 a party dispute between the "Partie Populaire Syrienne" and the Katā'ib[2] developed into an attempt on the part of the P.P.S. to take control of the government. By July the matter had been brought under control, and the leader of the party, Antoun Saadah, who had sought refuge in Syria, was handed over to the Lebanese authorities who tried and executed him post-haste on August 10th. However, the problems raised by the P.P.S. are by no means solved, and there are still a large number of followers of that faction. The present economic situation can only serve to increase their

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(1) Founded by Antoun Saadah in 1932, the P.P.S. demanded a Greater Syria, of which Lebanon would be only a part. It was a neo-fascist organization similar to but not identical with Nazism. It had a large following among the youth of the country and was completely non-sectarian.

(2) Lebanese Nationalist party, see Ch. 4.

appeal to the people.

The present government is decidedly anti-communist in its outlook. Charles Malik, the Lebanese representative at the U.N., has often tried to act as a mediator between East and West. However, the position of Lebanon is influenced by the fact that she is a country of traders and landowners, and as such her best interests lie with the Western democracies rather than with Russia. In a total war between Russia and the West, Lebanon would probably fall on the side of the West, but if occupied by the Russians, her government would no doubt try to cooperate with Communism. Like all small nations she has no free choice and is a pawn on the chessboard of international politics.

There exists in Lebanon an illegal Communist Party. Figures on its strength are not available, but judging from student demonstrations at the American University of Beirut and elsewhere, this movement has the support of a good number of young intellectuals, but it is by no means as strong as similar movements in Syria or Iraq. The fact that Lebanon is largely Christian may be a deterrent to the rapid growth of the communist movement in the country. However, the higher literacy rate among the Christians makes them more conscious of world affairs and they may, in time, if the economic conditions do not improve, adopt the "party line".

Although it is too soon to do more than take note of it, the new measure of the Lebanese Parliament to increase

the number of deputies from 55 to 77 may have serious effect on the next election.

Even a brief study of the history of Lebanon, such as presented here, focuses ones attention on a few outstanding propositions that seem to stand out in bold type.

1) Lebanese tradition and history have made the land of the Cedars a refuge for minorities. The mountains of Lebanon have become a veritable museum of religious sects.

2) The Lebanese mind is focused on sectarianism born of religious persecution. This was strengthened by the separate existence of the various communities resident in Lebanon and by French policy during the mandate.

3) Lebanon is a point of cultural contact between West and East. It has served as one of the two[1] important springboards for western cultural and political penetration of the Arab World.

4) The various groups within Lebanon have never lost their sectarianism or their consciousness of particularism. The Lebanese Republic is therefore a political entity composed of divident religious communities, each striving for its own ends. Its unity is the unity of minority groups banded

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(1) Egypt is the other.

together for mutual protection.

5) The Lebanese Republic is not now and shows no signs of becoming an economically stable unit.

6) Recent history of the Republic seems to prove that the republican form assumed by the Government is only superficial. It is only used as a cover to maintain the power of a small group of wealthy landlords.

7) The great problem facing the Lebanon is: will Lebanon acquiesce to absorbtion by Syria or a larger unit of Arab states (with special status for the Christian mountain); will she return to the position of a 'protected State' under the guidance of some European power, such as France; or will she attempt to create a national economic and political life and so maintain the present Republic of Lebanon. There are other possibilities, but the ones listed are the most important.

The rest of this study will be an analysis of how one group, the Katā'ib, proposes to settle this problem.

CHAPTER III

ON LEBANESE POLITICS IN GENERAL

Political parties in Lebanon are a recent development; at the present time there are seven legal parties worth attention and two very active but illegal ones.[1] In most cases these political groups- one hesitates to dignify them with the title of political parties - are nothing more than cliques banded together for their own personal gain. The present party in power, the Constitutional Bloc, which is the government of Lebanon, is nothing more or less than this. It has no visible organization, and as far as one can discern, no policy except that of maintaining its control of the country. One of the principle reasons for this situation is that Lebanon has not yet emerged from the stage of family and feudal control; the Lebanese people feel no great loyalty for their government, their primary interest being their family and their religious community. Therefore, the political parties that exist have used this family and sectarian loyalty for their own ends. Thus, most Lebanese political parties have become little more than family unions and religious

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(1) National Bloc, (Al-Kuttah al-Watanīyah), Constitutional Bloc, (Al-Kuttah al-Dustūrīyah), Progressive Socialists (al Hizb al-Taqaddimi al Ishtirāki), al-Katā'ib, National Works Party ('Usbat al 'Amal al-Kawmī), National Call (Al-Nidā'al-Jumhūri, Kawmī) and Pioneers (al-Talā'i) are the major legal parties. The Partie Populaire Syrienne (al-Hizb al-Kawmi al-Sūrī) and the Communists exist, but are illegal.

pressure groups. "The existence of political parties generally means that there is a conflict between two or more groups, namely that one group wishes to change the existing institutions in accordance with the law and the other group wishes to preserve the present status quo for as long as possible."(1) This at least is the traditional view of parties and party politics, but again this view does not fit Lebanon. The government of Lebanon is a small group of land holders and financiers and party politics are merely window-dressing on a facade of republicanism. While the will-to-power characterises most of the Lebanese political groups, even though most of them have no definite platform, there are certain basic differences between them. In the Lebanon religious feeling seriously affects the political situation and must be regarded as the most single important factor in Lebanese politics. The whole of Lebanese history has been one of struggle for existence by various religious groups, and today these sects through the mechanism of political parties continue the struggle. When Moslems and Christians work together in the same party, it is not due to any real tolerance or understanding, but is rather an attempt to preserve their vested interests, or face a common enemy.

Even though Arab politics do not operate along recognized lines, there has developed and there is still growing a

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(1) Hamilton Fyfe, The British Liberal Party. (London, 1928), p. 1.

strong nationalist spirit. "At a moment when Europe's political nationalism is already loosing its exclusive authority as the creed of the age, it is entrenching itself in Asia".[1] This spirit of nationalism has many facets - it can be seen in the various Pan-Arab movements, in Syrianism and also in Lebanese separatism. In most cases the inspiration for these movements was on a high plane and its adherents were young, enthusiastic, intellectuals, but unfortunately the leadership of the national movements has not been in their hands. Disillusioned and discouraged, large numbers of the youth have turned to Communism if for no better reason than to register among other things, a protest against the moral bankruptcy of their national rulers, and as a protest against western imperialism. One of the two[2] non-communist movements that has been successful in recruiting the youth of Lebanon is the Kata'ib.

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(1) H. Kohn, <u>A History of Nationalism in the East</u>, (London, 1929), p. 432.

(2) The other was the P.P.S. It was outlawed in 1949 - See p. 36.

C H A P T E R IV

HISTORY OF THE KATĀ'IB AND ITS DEVELOPMENT TO PARTY STATUS - 1936-1949.

The early years of the mandate had been difficult for the French. The Syrians and the Moslem Lebanese had put many obstacles in the path of the mandatory power. The Druzes, for centuries a warlike people, had been a continual thorn in the flesh of France. The only sizeable group which approved of the mandate were the Maronites and the other less important Uniate groups. The French held the opinion that Arab nationalism was merely a tool of the British, and they believed that most of the Sunni Moslems were hostile toward France. This view was based on the 1920 episode when the British had supported the aspirations of Faisal to the kingdom of Syria. Thus the strengthening of Lebanon, both economically and politically, was necessary if the French wished to maintain any real control in the Levant.

The founding of al-Najjādah by Muhiddin Nusūli in 1933 was viewed with alarm by the French authorities. As a paramilitary organization, al-Najjādah found favor with the Moslem youth, and soon adopted a program demanding independence for Lebanon and union with Syria. At first the movement was small, but by 1935 it claimed to have 2000 members.[1]

(1) Interview with Muhiddin Nusouli, editor of Beirut and founder of al-Najjādah - January 5, 1951.

In 1935 Pierre Gemayel made a tour of Europe and while in Berlin was very much impressed with the Nazi youth organizations. According to well informed authorities, he was lavishly entertained by the head of the German propaganda service, and, upon his return from Europe, his uncle, Sheikh Yusuf Gemayel of the Popular Front Party, encouraged him to organize the Maronite youth into an athletic society. It was hoped that such a youth organization could be used as a counter-weight to the Najjādah and as "shock troops" for Maronite political demonstrations. The French welcomed the idea, hoping that this new movement would act as a foil to the "Partie Populaire Syrienne" of Antoun Saadeh.[(1)] Baron de Lassus of the Harbor Works soon contacted Pierre Gemayel and offered him a spacious house in the center of town and an annual grant-in-aid of 35,000 Francs.[(2)] Père Couronne of the Jesuits offered his services as aumonier. The actual date of organization was November 21, 1936.[(3)] Besides Pierre Gemayel, Shefiq Nassif, George Naccashe, Charles Hilou and Emil Yarid were instrumental in getting the organization underway.[(4)] Response to the appeal was large, and soon the

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(1) "The Partie Populaire Syrienne" later became known as the Syrian National Socialist Party.

(2) U.S. Legation files - Beirut.

(3) Pierre Gemayel, "Connaissance des Kataebs, (Beirut, Nov. 1948), p. 2.

(4) Interview with the Party President, Pierre Gemayel, Dec. 22, 1950.

"Phalanges Libanaises", as it was then known, had a membership of several thousand. During the first year of its life, the Katā'ib operated along the lines of a para-military semi-Fascist youth group. Much attention was paid to physical exercise, sports and military drill. At the same time it conducted classes in patriotism. We can safely assume that all during this time the organization was more or less guided by its French protectors.

The unsettled political conditions in the Levant led to an order disbanding all para-military organizations and so the Katā'ib was officially dissolved under Arrête No. 1474/ E.C.,[1] November 17, 1937. Just why the authorities closed an organization that they were supporting is not clear. The only possible explanation is that they did not feel strong enough to disband some groups and not others. Perhaps the French felt that such action would actually strengthen the Katā'ib and increase its appeal to the Lebanese youth. Following the siezure of their headquarters by the police, the Katā'ib demonstrated at the Place des Canons on Sunday, November 21, 1937. After rioting for some hours the police and Katā'ib exchanged shots. The leader of the group, Pierre Gemayel and 100 of his followers, were arrested, but released a few days later.[2] Although under official ban from 1937

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(1) Gemayel, p. 2.

(2) Interview - Gemayel, December 22, 1950.

until November 27, 1943, the Katā'ib continued to function as before.

The period 1937 to 1943 could hardly be called a period of open collaboration between the French and the Katā'ib. Yet at the same time the Katā'ib did not become too outspoken against the mandatory power. The attempted coalition between al-Najjādah and the Katā'ib in 1936 had proved to be a failure; the basic point of disagreement being the status of Lebanon. The Najjādah aimed at Syro-Lebanese independence and union; whereas the Katā'ib wanted a separate Lebanon in treaty relationship with France.[1] By 1939 the party claimed a membership of 22,000 young men.[2] The character of the Katā'ib by 1941 was still that of a para-military group without any definite political aspirations. The idea of becoming an active political party was still to be developed. The British Military Handbook of 1941 does not even list them as a party.[3] As early as 1937, the organization's leader Pierre Gemayel stated:

> "The Lebanese Phalange does not constitute a political party; it is simply an organization to prepare the youth for their obligations and national independence... She (the Phalange) is for or against no one. She is for the Lebanon."

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(1) Interview with Mr. Muhiddin Nusouli, January 5, 1951.

(2) Gemayel, p. 88.

(3) American Christian Palestine Committee, The Arab War Effort, (N.Y.C., 1947), p. 28.

The first public statement made by Gemayel after founding the group emphasized the disinterestedness of the Katā'ib. At that time he stressed the need for collaboration with France, no doubt hoping that she would soon give the Lebanese their independence.(1) British occupation of Lebanon in 1941 caused the Katā'ib to change its policy in regard to politics. From 1941 until 1945 the movement was gradually evolving into a real political party.

On April 3, 1941, the Katā'ib organized a strike against the government of General Dentz and President Eddé. The issue of the strike was the manner in which 'ravitaillement' was being handled. Because of the general dissatisfaction of the people, the Katā'ib together with the rabble, was able to play a large part in forcing the resignation of the President and his government.(2) In May of the same year Pierre Gemayel and 35 other party members were threatened with exile to Palmyra unless they desisted from their periodic attacks on the government. The following year the Katā'ib entered the political ring and added its voice to the demand for the resignation of the Prime Minister, Ahmed Daouk and his minister of supply, Waÿēl Ezzedine, again over the issue of "ravitaillement".

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(1) At this time France and Lebanon were trying to negotiate a treaty of alliance which would recognize Lebanese independence, see p. 27, Ch. I.

(2) Gemayel, p. 15.

Although not real supporters of President Bechara El Khouri, the Katā'ib came to his support in the crisis of November 1943, and its youth played a noisy and somewhat effective role in the riots and strikes that greeted the French after their imprisonment of the government. Twenty three members of the party plus its leader were also imprisoned, but were set free after the President of the Republic and his cabinet had been released.[1] This was also another period of Katā'ib-Najjādah cooperation: both organizations took part in the demonstrations. During the November riots the Katā'ib claimed to have been the first to use the new Lebanese flag[2] which replaced the French tricolor with a more distinctively national flag of two horizontal red stripes bordering a white field on which rests the Cedar of Lebanon. This flag was officially adopted December 1, 1943, by the government.[3]

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(1) Gemayel, p. 94.

(2) The actual design for the present flag of Lebanon was suggested by Henri Pharaon during a meeting of a committee of seven deputies which had been appointed by the government to choose a new national banner. Final committee decision on the flag was taken at a critical moment in the history of the young republic, and the flag was presented to the people during the riots that followed the arrest of the government by the French in November 1943. Actually the colors and the Cedar had been used by the Syrian Protestant College (American University of Beirut) since it was founded in 1866. c.f. Harold Lamb, How Lebanon Won Its Flag and Freedom, Saturday Evening Post, (August 5, 1944), pp. 18-19, 97-98.

(3) Haddad, p. 96.

On November 27, 1943, a presidential decree No. 126/K annulled the arrête 1474/EC, and the party was officially recognized.[1] No doubt the recognition was granted for the part it played in the November riots.

The Protocol of Alexandria and the formation of the Arab League were feared by the Katā'ib, and they brought pressure to bear on the President of the Republic to press for recognition of Lebanon's special position in the Arab world.[2] However, their real entrance into politics was during the by-elections of 1945, when Iljas Rababy ran for a seat in the Chamber. His opponent, Philip Takala, of the Constitutional Bloc, defeated him, even though Rababy is supposed to have had French support. Later Pierre Gemayel pledged himself never to enter the political ring as a candidate for office. He claimed that he preferred to stay outside of active political life so that he could at all times maintain an independent position on matters of public interest. Using an old Kata'ib war cry, he called for "men of principle, doctrine and courage", men who could lead but not be led.[3]

The party wanted to be represented in Parliament for two principal reasons: (a) to have an official voice in the discussions concerning the Arab League, and (b) because they

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(1) Gemayel, p. 2.

(2) <u>Action</u>, August 16, 1946.

(3) <u>Action</u>, August 16, 1946.

feared that the present government was planning to work for closer union with Syria.(1)

1946 was a pre-election year, and the Katā'ib made good use of it to point up the failings of the incumbent government. Almost every issue of their newspapers "_al'Amal_" and "_Action_" editoralised on various aspects of governmental mismanagement. They demanded a revision of the electoral law, a reform of the system of education and an increase in the number of schools. They decried the graft present in the government and insisted that representation by religious communities be abolished.(2)

All of this was no doubt in preparation for the elections to be held in 1947. Unquestionably the Katā'ib hoped either to submit a list of candidates or to participate in a coalition with one of the other parties. Henri Pharaon and George Naccache both publicly suggested collaboration with the Katā'ib, but Pierre Gemayel refused to agree to the proposals. Why he refused is not definitely known, perhaps he expected the elections to be dishonest and thought that the party would gain more, by not becoming too involved in an election it could not possibly win. The Katā'ib did, however, put three candidates forward: Joseph Chader for Beirut,

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(1) Gemayel, p. 15.

(2) _Ibid._, pp. 176-198. This subject will be treated at length in the following chapters.

Elias Rababy and Joseph Saadeh for Mt. Lebanon.(1) The elections of May 25, 1947, were perhaps as fraudulent as any ever held, and for this reason the government party scored a complete victory. The Katā'ib candidates received very few votes and of course none were elected. Almost every newspaper and political group protested the election.(2) One of the outstanding protests was that of Pierre Gemayel which appeared as an open letter to the President of the Republic in "Al'Amal", shortly after the election.

> "Your Excellency, as I have the right to express the opinion of the youth of my country, I beg of you to give back to the people of Lebanon their confidence in themselves and their pride. This fraudulently chosen Parliament cannot eliminate fraud: the same government that supervises these elections cannot right the wrong. The nation denies all legality to Parliament and to the Government based on this Parliament and declares void every treaty or law emanating from it. There is only one way to act in this situation. It is to dissolve the Parliament by using your right to do so. Al-Katā'ib has one demand - dissolution of the Parliament and the formation of a neutral government to supervise free and true elections".(3)

The elections of May 27, 1947 mark the point at which the Katā'ib's metamorphosis from a para-military "boy scout" group to a full-fledged political party can be considered completed.

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(1) Interview with Pierre Gemayel, December 22, 1950.

(2) The Black Book of the Lebanese Elections of May 25, 1947, (N.Y.C., 1947), p. 46 to 50.

(3) Akl, Quodat, and Hunein, p. 36: Al'Amal, June 16, 1947: Muhiddin Nusouli believes that the Kata'ib's protest of the elections of 1947 was only perfunctory and that the party leaders were not shocked by the results. Interview, Jan. 5, 1951.

It is too early to make much of an assessment of the subsequent history of the Katā'ib, but some incidents should be noted. In May of 1949 the Katā'ib and the P.P.S. came to blows that ended the legal existence of the later. For several months preceding the May incident, the Katā'ib and P.P.S. carried on a war of words in their respective newspapers. This campaign was originally started by the Katā'ib and it is commonly believed that the government supported this action. The quarrel grew out of competition for members. Joummayzeh, a predominately Christian section of Beirut, is one of the strongholds of the Katā'ib, and Pierre Gemayel has great personal power in that section of the city. A Moslem merchant was beaten up by a group of Katā'ib roughs, and the merchant appealed to Gemayel for protection, which in turn was granted. The incident was fuel for the P.P.S., and they began to recruit members in Joummayzeh. When this came to the notice of the party, it was decided to have a show-down with the P.P.S. A gang battle ensued, and before it finished the P.P.S. printing press was destroyed.(1) At this point the government stepped in and attempted to arrest the leader of the P.P.S., Antoun Saadeh; however, he fled to the mountains. Within the next few days the government outlawed both the P.P.S. and the Katā'ib. The outlawing of the Katā'ib was only perfunctory, and within a few weeks

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(1) Interview with Pierre Gemayel, Dec. 22, 1950.

the party was recognized by the government under a new name, "Hizb al'Attihad al-Lubnani". However, the P.P.S. is still under official ban. The Government arrested over 300 members of the P.P.S., 69 of whom were brought to trial. If the Katā'ib - P.P.S. affair was not actually planned by the government in order to rid itself of a popular and dangerous movement, Gemayel certainly had the unofficial blessing of the present government.

The other important incident was the break between the National Bloc and the Katā'ib during the late summer of 1950. In September news articles in their respective party organs brought forth a gang of Katā'ib 'minute men' who broke into the press room of the National Bloc and ransacked the premises. The issue of the fight was the new government ruling on representation. The Katā'ib supported the increase of membership from 55 to 77, whereas the more orthodox Maronite National Bloc felt that the new scheme would reduce its effective political strength. Since that time the issue has been largely forgotten, and, through the mediation of the Maronite Patriarch, the breach has been outwardly healed.

In passing, we should take note of several of the phenomena that have distinguished the Katā'ib from other Lebanese youth organizations. They were known until 1946 as the "Phalanges Libanaises". According to its own reasoning, the party chose this name to make certain that foreign

elements would better understand the spirit of the movement.[1] In its French-language newspaper the group was always referred to by this name, and even in its Arabic press, the words "Phalanges Libanaises" was sometimes superimposed in French in the Arabic editions. Since 1946[2] the designation al-Katā'ib has been substituted. The reason given for the change in name was that the word "Phalanges" had come to mean, in popular thinking, a fascist, and in particular a Spanish Fascist organization. The "Phalange", not wanting to be associated with such a group, decided to change its name.[3] Although not stated by the party, there is another reason for the change. "Phalange" is a purely French word, while Katā'ib is the Arabic equivalent. It appears, therefore, that the change of names was an attempt to purge the party of an obvious foreign influence and give a more national character.

When Pierre Gemayel started the Katā'ib as a youth organization, he designed a uniform and introduced a raised-hand salute that was very much like the one used in Fascist Italy. During the 1939 -45 war, and without any publicity,

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(1) Gemayel, p. 50.

(2) Exact date not available. However, Action began to refer to the "Phalange" as the Katā'ib in June of 1946. There have been lapses in this policy and occasionally the name "Phalanges Libanaises" reappeared in other issues. I do not believe there was ever a clear cut policy on this point.

(3) Gemayel, interview, January 5, 1951.

the salute gradually developed into the type used by the British army. The uniform of the Katā'ib guards consists of a Khaki military shirt, Sam Brown belt, and navy-blue trousers gathered at the top of high shoes. Over the shoes are worn large white spats. In addition, the guards wear a gray sun helmet. The official party insignia is a small round aluminium pin with the Cedar of Lebanon in the center; around the periphery is written the words, "al-Katā'ib".

CHAPTER V

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

The President

The chief executive of the Katā'ib is known by several titles. In their French language publications he is always referred to as "Le Chef Superieur", whereas in most of the Arabic documents his title is that of Rais al A'la' etc, which in English is translated to mean President Superior.

The president of the party is elected by the party cabinet for a term of three years. He holds office on good behaviour and may be re-elected, impeached and dismissed from his post. In case of impeachment a special Disciplinary Council is convoked.[1] The special council is composed of any 7 members of the Cabinet, with the exception of the Chief of the Disciplinary Service, who is not eligible. However the possibility of impeaching the President is very slight since the selection of the party hierarchy is completely in his hands.

The President of the Katā'ib has in effect dictatorial powers. Except for unofficial guidance and advice given him by Elias Rababy, Maurice Gemayel and Joseph Chader, he is omnipotent and all powerful. As leader of the party he chooses the 12 chiefs who head the various departments of the Katā'ib.[2]

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(1) Reglements Generals et Code de Discipline. (Nov. 21, 1942), article 38.

(2) Ibid. article 21.

These men are appointed to office by the President and hold office at his please and may be dismissed at any time. The cabinet in turn elects the president.

As President he assumes the leadership of the party.[1] He is the official representative of the party at all functions, but in his absence may designate the Secretary General or anyone else to act as his locum tennum.[2] His power includes the right to make all appointments within the party.

Veneration for the President of the party almost reaches the point of worship. In an article published in "Action" and reprinted in Connaissance des Kataebs he is referred to in such terms as "The rock to which we are tied, and like our Lebanese mountains he is always visible. He is our unalterable leader"[3] etc. On Tuesday, of each week, the President meets with his cabinet to discuss party policy and strategy. However, this cabinet serves in an advisory capacity only, and he is not obliged to act upon their advice.[4] Any decisions arrived at during these meetings are forwarded to the interested services.

The President meets with the members of the "Services" on the first Tuesday of each month; with the Chiefs of the Services, the Assistant Chiefs and the Secretaries of the Beirut area on the second Monday of each month. Twice a year

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(1) Reglements, article 20.

(2) Ibid, article 22.

(3) Connaissance, p. 51.

(4) Code, p. 6.

a meeting is held in Beirut for the various party functionaries who live in the provinces. As with the cabinet and even more so, these meetings are only advisory.(1) Actually they are a series of "pep talks" during which the President tries to kindle more enthusiasm for the party. Once a year he delivers a "State of the Nation" speech to a gathering of all the members of the Katā'ib. According to article 26 of the party constitution, he is required to discuss the general well-being of the party, the general political situation, and what action the party plans to take in the forthcoming year.

In its 15 years of life the Katā'ib has had only one President, Pierre Gemayel, who has continually been reelected to office. Without question he is the best equiped to lead the party, but even if he were not, the party organization is such that, it would be very difficult to get rid of him.

The only check that the organization has on the President is the Party Constitution and it defines misconduct so broadly that it would be virtually impossible to expel him from office. We can, therefore, assume that Gemayel will head the Kata'ib until he voluntarily resigns.

The Secretariat

The other executive branch of the party is the Secretariat, headed by a Secretary General, who is at present

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(1) Ibid, articles 24-25, p. 6.

Joseph Chader.[1] As all officials, he is appointed by the President.

The Secretary General is charged with the execution of presidential decrees and supervises all the administrative details connected with operation of the party. Four bureaus compose the Secretariat; they are, Liaison, Archives, Justice and Editing.[2] The Bureau of Justice is in charge of functions effecting party discipline as defined in the "Code de Discipline". The preparation of texts of decisions and commiques as well as party correspondence is intrusted to the Editing Bureau. The Liaison Bureau acts as a register for documents and other party papers received by the President and Secretary General; whereas the Archives Bureau is the general repository for all party literature and correspondence.[3] Even though most of the functions of the Secretariat are clerical, the Secretary General is the second most influential man in the party. He is able to place before the Party President the business upon which he must take action. This function alone gives him great power for if he chooses he can hold back petitions from party members and submit only those which please him. All major inter-party business must pass through his office, and while it is not necessary that he approve

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(1) Appendix I & II complete diagram of the parties organization.

(2) <u>Reglements</u>, article 29, p. 7.

(3) <u>Ibid.</u> article 30, p. 7.

it before passing them on, in practice he actually does. In effect he acts as a shield between the "run of the mill" party members and the President.

The Services

There are 12 "Services" in the Katā'ib and they would correspond to ministries in a national government. Each of the "Services" is run by a Director (Chef) who is assisted by an Assistant Director (sous chef). The 12 departments encampass all the party activities. They are: "Cadres", Finances, Discipline, Regional Service, Emigration and Immigration, Social Affairs, National Education, Youth, Economics, Law and Regulations, Propaganda and Press, and Party Police (Controle).(1) Each of these 12 departments has a definite function, and their duties are carefully outlined in the party constitution.

The "Cadres", headed by William Hawie, recruits and registers new members. In its capacity, as intermediary between the central Beirut headquarters and the provincial offices, it is extreamly powerful. It must see that outlying offices enforce the orders of the President of the Katā'ib.

The department of Finances under the direction of Abdo Saab is charged with raising funds and maintaining Katā'ib property.(2) It has a monthly income from membership fees and

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(1) Reglements, article 31, p. 7.

(2) Ibid. article 35.

grants-in-aid from such wealthy Maronites as Michel Dumit and Pierre Gemayel himself. Whether the French continue their support is an unanswered question.(1) The director of this department is personally responsible for the financial activities of the Katā'ib.

The Disciplinary Department operates in accordance with a rigid law known as "Code de Discipline", which defines infractions and outlines their punishment.(2) This department holds great power within the party; its director is Joseph Saadeh. One of the interesting features of the "Code de Discipline" is the type and definition of crimes. They are listed as - Contraventions, Delinquency, and Crimes; how similar this is to the Roman Catholic Church's definition of sin. Punishments met out by the Council range all the way from a warning to loss of office while the most severe consists of being expelled from the party. Crimes range from disloyal statements to what the party chooses to call treason. The striking fact about the "Code de Discipline" is its very authoritarian character. If the code is only slightly adhered to, and it is generally believed to be strictly enforced, there is almost no possibility for a difference of opinion within the party ranks, and to disagree publically with

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(1) American Legation, Beirut.

(2) Reglements, article 36; Action, Nov. 21, 1939; Organization of the Phalanges, march 15, 1945.

statements of the party President makes one subject to appear in the party courts.(1) Even attendance at Katā'ib meetings is considered obligatory and failure to attend puts the offender in the category of having committed a crime of Contravention. Not wearing one's Katā'ib button, or, and this is almost unbelievable, "Any political or religious discussions in Katā'ib headquarters or during meetings, gatherings or social events"(2) is punishable. This last rule is applicable only to younger party members and is no longer enforced in relation to adults. The logic of such an article is, to say the least, obscure. A great deal is made of the proper honor due the Lebanese flag and Lebanon's national honor.(3) Next to outright disobediance to the President of the party, disrespect to the nation and her flag is considered as a most heinous crime.

Under the listing "Crimes", one finds the following: Immoral conduct, any act of disaffection that effects the attitude of other members of the Katā'ib, and any outrage committed upon the national flag in the presence of five or more people.(4)

The penalties for the first category of crimes - those of Contravention - begin with a personal warning by a party official and range through a public warning, on to suspension

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(1) Code de Discipline, article 2.

(2) Ibid. article 2, sec. 10.

(3) Ibid. article 3, sec. 8.

(4) Ibid. article 4, sec's 3, 4 and 7.

for a maximum of 10 days.[1]

Delinquences, the second category of offences, are punishable by public proscription, exclusion from meetings for a period of 6 months, warnings, etc. Lowering of rank within the organization, prohibition from being nominated to office and, suspension from the Katā'ib for three months are other means of punishment.[2]

Crimes are otherwise attended to, with such punishments as: lowering of rank or prohibition from holding office, suspension for three months, and finally outright expulsion from the party.[3]

Disciplinary Councils are established by a special decree of the President who also defines their competence. In general they have jurisdiction over Contraventions and Delinquency, with one exception, they have no jurisdiction over the President. The Superior Disciplinary Council deals with crimes committed by ordinary members of the party and with Contraventions and Delinquencies of the directors of the departments.

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(1) Code, article 7, sec's. 1, 3, & 5.

(2) Ibid, article 9, sec's 1, 2, & 3.

(3) In June of 1949 three members of the Katā'ib living in Zahley were accused of having committed a 'Crime'. These three men, had publically destroyed their Katā'ib membership cards. A Disciplinary council was convoked under the presidency of the Director of Discipline. The court recommended that the three be suspended for a period of three months. This sentence was duely approved by the party president; however, as extra punishment the Katā'ib ordered its members to boycott the shops run by the three 'criminals'.

This council sits in Beirut but when hearing cases of non-Beirut residents, it may if it wishes, meet in another town.(1)

The composition of such bodies differ. For the ordinary councils there is a President and 2 members, whereas the Superior Council is composed of the Beirut Council plus two additional members, both of whom must be equal or superior in party rank to the accused. If the accused is a member of the department of Discipline the court must be composed of the Secretary General and two department heads.(2)

For trial of the party President the council must include seven of the Department Directors. However the Director of Discipline is expressly excluded from sitting on this council.

Attached to the Councils of Discipline are courts whose duty, while somewhat vague, seems to be that of recording testimony and interviewing witnesses. As in most affairs of the Katā'ib, the final authority in all cases lies with the President of the party. It is the President who decides what the decision will be and what punishment will be applied.(3)

The Regional Service is composed of all branch headquarters outside of Beirut and is headed by Joseph Chader (pro temps). This department is responsible for organizing new groups throughout the country and in helping to direct such

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(1) Code, articles 31, 32, 33, and 34.

(2) Ibid, article 37. (3) Ibid, article 49.

units. The Regional Service may assist any of the other 12 departments in its functions when their activities pertain to the party organization in rural areas.(1) The Regional Service is an amazingly effective and efficient arm of the party. Through its records and chain of command, it can locate any member of the Katā'ib.

The country as a whole is divided into six administrative units: Beirut, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, South Mt. Lebanon, North Mt. Lebanon, and the Baaka'.(2) An administrative unit is divided into a province; a province is subdivided into counties; counties are broken down into sections, sections into divisions and divisions into cells. The areas included in any one of these divisions is determined by the President of the Party. As a typical example of this type of organization let us look at the Administrative District of North Lebanon. At the head of the district is a Director assisted by a committee appointed by the party President. This administrative district is subdivided into five provinces: Akkār, Tripoli, Batrūn, 'Ākūrah, and Zegharta. Each of these provinces has a committee composed of the provincial hierarchy and a director. The committees oversee the activities of the next division, that of the county. The hierarchy of a county corresponds to the organization of a province.

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(1) Code, article 37.

(2) Inshā' al-Aksām al-Katā'bīyah fī al-Akālīm, (Beirut, 1944), p. 3.

In the province of Tripoli, for example, are the following counties: Kfar 'Immai, Karnain, al Muhr, al-Kubbah, Kahr al-Malul and Buhsas. Such counties are named for the principal village in the area, but may contain a number of villages. A division is usually composed of from 9 to 15 members and is a local unit. If the division has a larger membership than 15, it too is subdivided into cells. A cell, by definition, therefore, has five or less members. Each division and section has an administrative committee composed of a director and officers; a cell has no organization other than a leader.(1)

All of the various units are attached to the Regional Service in Beirut.(2) This sort of highly centralized organization is typical of the Katā'ib and seems to have been inspired by local governmental organization which in turn is a composite of Turkish and French organization. It also bears an amazing resemblance to the divisions in the Roman Catholic Church.

The Department of Propaganda and Press is headed by Elias Rababy who is the only cabinet member to receive a salary. He is editor of the two newspapers published by the Katā'ib: "al'Amal" an Arabic daily, and "Action" a French weekly. The editor claims a circulation of 8000 copies a day for "Al'Amal" and 2500 per issue for "Action". These figures are high and a better estimate would be 5000 per day for

(1) Diagram of Regional Organization, appendix I.

(2) Inshā', p. 3.

"Al'Amal and 2000 per issue for "Action". "Action"and"Al'Amal" were both founded in 1939 and were issued until 1946 as a single bi-lingual newspaper. Then on Nov. 21, 1946, "Al'Amal" reappeared as a daily Arabic paper and "Action" became a weekly on Oct. 3, 1948. In addition to their newspapers, they issue a large number of pamphlets.

The Department of Immigration and Emmigration concerns itself mainly with keeping in touch with the Lebanese who have gone abroad. According to the party constitution this department's supposed to "study the problems caused by emigration and immigration".[1] Actually this group headed by Elias Touma is of vital importance to the party since much importance is given to the immigration problem. Most of the Lebanese who have immigrated have been Christians, and in order to hold their own against the growing Moslim minority, the Christians and particularly the Maronites have tried to induce Lebanese resident abroad to keep their citizenships. With this in mind, the Katā'ib organized an Immigrant Congress in 1945 and were backers of the movement which caused the Syro-Lebanese American Federation to hold their 1950 convention in Beirut and Damascus.

The Department of Social Affairs, under the leadership of Jacques Ch̄eded concerns itself with finding work for the unemployed and in dispensing relief. Following an old axiom

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(1) Code. article 39.

"Charity begins at home" they are almost solely concerned with their own party members. This department also studies social problems and submits reports as to how they might be solved. Operating a small dispensary and a legal bureau, they give free medical and legal aid. In addition the group is supposed to organize a day for aid to the needy and the protection of children.(1)

The Department of National Education, another of the 12 "Services", does little more than try to inculcate Lebaneseism(2) and Katā'ib ideas into the youth. At present Jamil Jabre is director of this department.

The Youth Department, under the direction of Ferdinand Dagher, is primarily interested in organizing Katā'ib cells among students in schools and universities.(3) This group has an ambitious program and even envisages work among Lebanese students studying abroad. The most active cells are in the French religious schools and at the Jesuit operated St. Joseph's University in Beirut. In the more pan-Arab atmosphere of the American University of Beirut, they have been notably unsuccessful.

Article 43 of the party constitution calls for a department to study the national economic situation. At the time of writing, there is no director for this department. It may

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(1) Code, article 40. (2) Ibid, article 41.

(3) Ibid, article 42.

be that the hopelessness of the Lebanese economy defies even an organization as active as the Katā'ib seems to be.

The Law Department studies and suggests revisions in the Katā'ib rules and regulations. It also studies national laws with a view to suggesting necessary reforms.(1)

The Katā'ib maintains its own police force. The functions of this organization are three in number: security, traffic, and information. The police force is under the control of the Secretary General of the party. This department keeps a daily record of its activities and of the events taking place in the nation.

An adjunct to the 12 departments is the "Groupement Feminin", (Womens group). While not an inteagral part of the Katā'ib, it serves, nonetheless, as a women's auxiliary. The leader of the women's group is Miss Laure Nasr. This organization maintains only one unit, and that is in Beirut. Like regular departments of the Katā'ib, the women's group is controlled by the party President who appoints its director.(2) Decisions affecting the group are made by the Party President with advice from the director of the women's group. Its only independence is in the matter of finances, since it maintains a system apart from the regular Katā'ib department of finances.(3)

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(1) Code, article 44.

(2) Statuts du Groupement Feminin Phalangiste, (Beirut, March 1, 1941), article 14.

(3) Ibid, article 16.

However, even its constitution can be amended at will by the party President.

Membership

The Katā'ib recognizes three types of members; active, honorary, and sympathetic. These categories are broken down as follows: active members are organized into three corps, young people age 10 to 14, Cadets ages 14 to 18 and adults 18 years and above.(1) Only men are admitted to the party as active members. Decision on membership is taken by the party President on advice from the director of the Cadres.(2) If admission is refused, a candidate may make another application after a lapse of six months.(3) Honorary membership is conferred by the party President on leading personalities;(4) they may be either Lebanese or foreigners. The third type of members are those who are sympathetic to the organization. They must be more than 18 years old and must apply for this status. The party constitution does not make clear the reason for, or the position of, such members, and it appears that this type of membership exists only on paper.

Duties of Members

Article 13 of the party constitution sums up the duties of a member of the Katā'ib as follows:

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(1) Reglements, articles 1 & 2. (2) Ibid, article 3.

(3) Ibid, article 4. (4) Ibid, article 5.

> "It is absolutely necessary to honor Lebanon and to have complete respect for her flag and that of the Lebanese Phalange; to defend at all times and under all circumstances the honor and dignity of Lebanon and the Lebanese Phalange; to work for the propogation of the movement by written and spoken words as well as deeds; to fulfill ones civic and professional duties, to develop the sentiments of national honor and dignity; to be always and forever the model of a good citizen."(1)

In addition to this, and more important from the point of view of politics, every member is expected to obey blindly all orders and commands of the party President.(2) Such overemphasis on nation, and party, gives the entire movement a slight totalitarian tinge and brings to light a kind of thinking that will be more clearly shown in the chapter on the aims of the party.

The duties of members of the women's group are almost identical to those listed above; and differ only in the language used to describe them. They hope to prepare the Lebanese women for their obligations to God, country and family and to develop in them tolerance and respect for the liberty of others.(3)

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(1) Reglements, article 13. (2) Ibid, article 16.

(3) Statuts Feminin, article 6.

C H A P T E R VI

AIMS AND ATTITUDES.

At the very outset we must distinguish between the published aims and attitudes of the Katā'ib and those which it holds, but does not make public. In the East oral traditions of any group, be they religious or political, are always as important, if not more important, than what has been committed to writing. In the case of this party, as will be shown in the development of this chapter, the oral traditions, that is to say the unpublished aims and attitudes of the party are by far greater in political significance than those published.

As a doctrinary party, the Katā'ib has taken an official stand on almost every issue and controversy. Their scope runs from an official party view on Lebanese history to a position concerning the conditions of the streets in Beirut. No problem seems to escape their perusal, although at times their views are dimmed by the fogs of an overpowering nationalism.

One of the first public statements of Pierre Gemayel was a pronouncement outlining the aims of the Katā'ib.

> "The Katā'ib is an organization of patriotic youth. Their aim is essentially national. We work toward the formation of a Lebanese nation conscious of its duties and its rights in an independent and sovereign state. With this in mind it attempts: to form a citizen having national ideals and to prepare the youth to shoulder their civic responsibilities in accordance with the ideals of family and nation".(1)

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(1) <u>Gemayel</u>, p. 3; <u>Statutes</u>, article I.

This same manifesto goes on to point out that the party intends to develop in the youth of Lebanon a sense of honor, a spirit of sacrifice and tolerance and respect for the rights of others.[1]

In this early Katā'ib publication, stress is laid on the non-sectarian nature of the party, "the Lebanese Phalange is completely Lebanese and national, it maintains no sectarian or racial bias".[2] This much talked of interracial and non-sectarianism of the Katā'ib has been one of their major war cries since the organization first began. On Feb. 16, 1950, Mr. George Chader, Regional Director, stated in a public lecture, "Sectarianism was foisted on the Lebanon by Turkey and Egypt.... and it is counter to the best interests of the country". Pierre Gemayel's public statements on this subject have been numerous and clear; time and time again he has stressed the dangers that such a system brings with it. He likes to point out that nationalism based on sectarianism is doomed to failure.[3] It is literally impossible to read an issue of <u>Action</u> or <u>Al'Amal</u> without finding some reference to this subject. It appears that the party's attitude toward this vital issue has been influenced by the study of French history. Looking at France, they realize the dangers involved in sectarianism, and in particular the brand which operates in

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(1) <u>Statutes</u>, article I. (2) <u>Ibid</u>, article I.

(3) <u>Gemayel</u>, p. 64.

Lebanon.... The values of the French Revolution, which have been taught to most Lebanese school children, show themselves in the Katā'ib's stand on this particular issue.

A very interesting and revealing doctrine of the party is their view of Lebanese history. Their extremely chauvinistic position is called by them "Le Libanesme, Une Doctrine". One must not underemphasize their position in regard to their doctrine of history, since it forms the basis for most of the party's political philosophy. To begin with, they insist that Lebanon is both an historic and geographic entity.[1]

> "Modern Lebanon is the successor to the ancient Phoenicians and for six centuries she has continually attracted the attention of the world. She has played a decisive role in the history of the Orient, under Fakhreddine II and Amir Yousef and Amir Bashir, and (particularly) in the international crisis of 1840. Since 1860, Europe and the world have continually recognized the existence of the Lebanese nation. We know and we shall keep in mind the Cultural mission started by Phoenicia, and Modern Lebanon will continue (this tradition) in modern times."[2]

In regard to the geographic unity of the country, the party has this to say:

> "Its frontiers are natural ... and (the country) possesses a variety of natural resources which fortunately give this small country unity and prosperity. Lebanese unity is indivisible; all the regions are equally indispensable to its well-being and development".[3]

Such a view of history, which completely ignores the generally

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(1) <u>Action</u>, Nov. 1, 1943; Gemayel, p. 6.

(2) <u>Action</u>, April 25, 1943; Gemayel p. 6.

(3) <u>Ibid</u>. p. 6.

accepted theories of Lebanese history, is for them a positive position. They claim to reject the theory of a Christian or a Moslem Lebanon and insist that the ideas of Christian-Moslem cooperation were born in Beirut during the rule of Fakhr ad-Dīn. The very thought of a Greater Syria is anathema to the Katā'ib. "This theory, the work of orientalists who are subservient to imperialist politics, is not founded on history".(1) In the same breath they reject Pan-Arabism and the theory of an Arab nation. In refutation of the statement that a common language is proof of the relationship of Lebanon to the Arab world, they maintain that a common language aids in good relations, but does not constitute a national tie, pointing out the example of Switzerland, the South American Nations, the United States and Great Britain.

This interpretation of history, while contrary to the views of most Anglo-Saxon orientalists is after all the view of history that the French taught the Lebanese in their secondary schools and at their university. It is a position that is taken in order to bolster up the separate existence of Greater Lebanon. Most political groups claim for their own the history and traditions of a people. When a sufficiently national history does not exist, it is usually invented. Since the Katā'ib publically rejects Lebanon as a "Christian home" they found it necessary to find other props

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(1) Gemayel, p. 7.

for their existence. This they have done by exaggerated claims concerning the past greatness of Lebanon, a sample of which was given above. Their "raison d'être" then is the preservation of Lebanon. Lebanon must be non-sectarian and tolerant to all groups and a refuge from oppression. It is at this point that the Katā'ib shows its true colors. The Sunni Moslems never wanted Lebanon to exist as a separate unit and were incorporated into Lebanon against their wishes at the insistence of France. The fact that the Katā'ib wants a separate Lebanon with a complete separation of church and state is very understandable. They know that in a modern state Christian principles tend to underlie the theory of democratic government and that a separation of religion from government will mean a greater loss to Islam than to the Maronites and the other Christian communities. Whereas it is almost impossible for Islam, as yet, to divest itself of theocratic principles, Christianity can conform very well to modern political organization. The Katā'ib is no more on less than an attempt on the part of the Christians and particularly the Maronites to confront and confuse Islam with a façade of western political idealism. Islam, is itself, an all embracing nationalism; any movement which tends to break down the catholicity of Islam must be considered as basically anti-Islamic. No Moslem can really accept to be ruled by non-Moslems. He may make the best of matters for a time, but rule of non-Moslems over

Moslems, has to be viewed by him as a temporary situation.(1)

The Katā'ib claim of Phoenician traditions and ancestry for the Lebanon is ludicrous. The amount of Phoenician blood after some forty invasions and 4 millenniums must be so minute as to defy even the most rapid modern Phoenician. Furthermore, the Phoenician City States were located on the shores of the Mediterranean and never penetrated into what is known as Mt. Lebanon. The great traditions of Phoenician as incorporated into the Lebanese Republican scene are mythical. Lebanon is still a land of shrewd business men, much as the Phoenicians were shrewd business men. However, this is not a tradition passed on by the Phoenicians as much as it is the product of social, economic and geographic conditions. Over-population, the poor quality of the soil and Lebanon's position on the sea have turned her people into traders and merchants. That Lebanon was the center of the Arab Renaissance, something of which even "modern Phoenicians" are proud, is not due to the Phoenicians having invented the alphabet, but rather to American and French missionaries who came into the area at the beginning of the 19th century.

The contention that Lebanon forms a geographical unit hardly merits rebuttal.(2) Mt. Lebanon might be considered a

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(1) Snouck Hurgrouje, Mohammedanism, (N.Y.C., 1916), p. 114.

(2) Adam Smith, Historical Geography of the Holy Land, (N.Y.C. 1907), p. 45; Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed. "The Lebanons are the central mountain passes of Syria".

geographical entity, but "Grand Liban" with its low hills to the east and French created borders is not. As for natural resources Lebanon is a "church mouse" among the nations. Her so-called natural resources consist of a beautiful countryside, and a hard working farm and a shrewd business class.

The party's dislike for orientalists who propose Arab or Syrian union is based on two main factors. First the Katā'ib fears any move that would merge Lebanon into a larger confederation which they feel would be predominantly Islamic, and secondly they share the French attitude that any Arab Confederation would be the tool of Great Britain.

The party's view of history sums up their fears and aspirations. Yet it also points up an inconsistency in Katā'ib policy. While demanding the continued existence of "Grand Liban", they wish to destroy one of the props that bolsters it up. It is the Christian elements in Lebanon that have been the moving force in Lebanese separation, yet the Katā'ib wishes to destroy the political power of the Christian churches in order to achieve a "laique" state. If and when they succeed in doing this, they will find a Lebanon that is much more willing to join with Syria or even a larger Arab unit, in which case the Katā'ib is working for its own destruction. I am not at all sure, however, that the party is sincere in its demand for separation of Church and State - this whole problem will be discussed at length later.

The Katā'ib has committed itself to a long list of reforms which if carried out would make the Lebanon one of the most progressive states in the family of nations. With such an ambitious program as they have outlined, the problem of implimentation would be extremely difficult. Just what are these utopian proposals of the Katā'ib? Their social and economic reforms are words rather than action.

The party recognizes the right of laborers to organize, but to what extent these unions may apply pressure is not mentioned. Their anti-communist bias is shown in the fact that they do not want labor unions to fall under "foreign control" but look forward to the formation of a real national Labor Unions.[1]

The present system of education is soundly criticized by the party. They feel that it is not sufficiently national. They wish to establish a unified system of education that will inculcate the theories of nationalism into every student.[2] What they really mean is that they want a system of education that will spread the particular ideas of Lebanese separatism held by the party. They fear most the American mission schools and the American University, which they feel are pro-Arab and anti-Lebanese. They would like to reshape education into what they think would be a truly national system, but which would

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(1) Action, May 1, 1950.

(2) Speech given by Pierre Gemayel at May Day celebration, 1950.

really be nothing more than a Lebanese version of the French system of education.[1]

The Katā'ib also calls for a system of universal military service. Knowing full well that Lebanon cannot actually protect itself from a major attack, they visualize this training as a stimulus to the development of Lebanese nationalism.[2]

On emigrants, they have adopted a policy very much in line with their political philosophy. They insist that Lebanese emigrants and their children be allowed the right to vote, no matter where they maintain their residence and regardless of whether or not they keep their Lebanese citizenship.[3] The practical implications behind this is clear. Most emigrants have been Christian Lebanese, and as such they can be depended on to cherish Lebanese separatism and thus help to neutralize the rapid increase of the non-Christian population. While no official census has been taken since 1933,[4] a good many informed people believe that the non-Christian elements are now in the majority.

The Katā'ib maintains a more enlightened political attitude toward women than any other political group in the

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(1) After long conversations at a meeting with the Assistant Chiefs of the party, this is the conclusion I reached; Action, Nov. 11, 1950.

(2) Party Directive, Nov. 21, 1944, p. 14.

(3) Letter to President Tabet Written by Pierre Gemayel, July 19, 1943.

(4) During the occupation of Lebanon by the British forces an unofficial census was taken.

country. They applauded women's suffrage in Syria and have been active in trying to gain political rights for Lebanese women. They are the only party that has an effective women's group. They reason that the women most likely to assume any political roles will be Christians and they in turn will help preserve the Lebanon in its present independent status.

During the Arab-Israel war, "Action" and "Al'Amal" the party organs of the Katā'ib, adopted the usual Arab attitude of violent opposition to the Zionists. The Party, too, issued statements concerning the danger caused by the rise of the new Jewish state. Nonetheless, the view of many members of the Katā'ib, as well as many non-Katā'ib Maronites, was actually in sympathy with the cause of Israel.(1) They hoped that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would divert the Moslem pressure from Lebanon and direct it toward Israel. With the Arab world's attention focused on Israel, Lebanon would be given a respite from her age-old struggle to maintain herself as a partially Christian state. This type of reasoning is in line with the observations of Dr. Faris, when he pointed out that nationalism based on religion has given rise to a series of religo-national states in the 20th century: "Pakistan, Zionistan and Lebanistan".(2) In line with this stream of thinking, Patriarch Arida sent a statement to the

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(1) S.O.S.

(2) Nabih Amin Faris, Ghuyūm 'Arabīyah, (Beirut, 1950), pp. 34-5.

United Nations in 1945[1] which proposed the establishment of a Christian national home in Lebanon as well as a Jewish state in Israel. Pressure of Arab public opinion, made it impossible for the Katā'ib to make public its real sentiments on the Arab-Zionist war. They reasoned, and I believe correctly, that should Lebanon refuse to support the Arab cause, the position of Lebanon would become impossible, surrounded as she is by Arab Moslem states. On the issue of Israel, the party is split. The more conservative Maronite elements have no fear of Israel, whereas the younger and more progressive members feel that Israel is as great a danger to Lebanese independence as is Syria.[2] What Pierre Gemayel thinks on this question is hard to say. Publically he supports the government and in an interview he refused to make any further statements, referring me to his published stand.[3]

This party, like any political organization, tries to appeal to as many segments of society as possible. Its economic reorganization plans are aimed primarily at the laboring class and the young intellectuals. What they visualize is a type of "New Deal" which would attempt to redistribute the

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(1) <u>S.O.S.</u>

(2) This opinion came out at a conference of the following assistant department directors of the party: Obaid Issa, Edmond Aoun, Jamil Jabre, Nikola Mutran and Joseph Jibran, Nov. 13, 1950. I had been invited to present questions to them and asked them the following question. "Do you feel that the appearance of Israel on the international scene has reduced Moslem pressure on Lebanon?"

(3) Interview with Pierre Gemayel, Jan. 23, 1951.

wealth and at the same time not destroy its sources. In vague terms they speak about a graduated income tax that would distribute the tax burden more equitably.[1] The radical elements of the party, largely in opposition to Pierre Gemayel, talk of government operated industries. In particular they would nationalize "heavy industry". However, as far as I am informed, Lebanon has at the present time no industry that would come under that category. The more conservative elements, Pierre Gemayel among them, would try to create artificial industries in the Lebanon.[2] They hope to introduce textile manufacturing on a large scale. They believe that Lebanon could manufacture such articles as shoes, brooms, brushes, and even automobiles. They would like to see the introduction of oil refineries, pointing out that since two pipe lines terminate in Lebanon, the oil should be refined here as well. Such projects of the Katā'ib are based on the assumption that a law is sufficient to produce an industry. I am afraid that little consideration has been given to means whereby the impoverished Lebanese government would raise funds to build oil refineries, or how the Iraq Petroleum Co. and the Arabian American Oil Co. could let the Lebanon refine the oil, which after all is not the property of the country.

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(1) Interview with Obaid Issa, Edmond Aoun, Jamil Jabre, Nikola Mutran and Joseph Jibran, Nov. 13, 1950.

(2) Interview with Pierre Gemayel, Jan. 5, 1951.

Social security stands high on the list of reforms that the Katā'ib would like to introduce. As to the exact form of social security, there is a difference of opinion. One group led by Mitri Assha feels that Lebanon has not reached the point of social organization and development in which a radical plan of social security could operate. He points out that agriculture is still Lebanon's greatest industry and social security that does not aid the farmers would be of little use. Yet to give agricultural workers social security is as yet impossible.(1) The other faction led by Obeid Issa would institute a sort of cradle-to-grave plan as soon as possible. This group believes that a plan of social security which offers adequate protection to workers will strengthen the national economy and reduce the dangers of Communism.(2)

As the protector of Lebanese honor and independence, one would assume, the Katā'ib would be very sensitive about foreign investments and interests in the country. Yet the party's record on such matters does not lead to such a conclusion. During the negotiations that led up to the signature of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line - Lebanese Convention of August 10, 1946, which permitted construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line through Lebanese territory, the party newspaper referred to it only twice in the months preceding the signature

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(1) Action, May 8, 1950.

(2) Action, May 1, 1950; Al'Amal, April 30, 1950.

of the convention. The general tenor of the articles was that finally the government and " Tap Line " were coming to agreement; agreement that was long overdue. " Because of the national interest, we say welcome to you".(1)

Perhaps the excitment and general nausea caused by the unsettled political condition and the difficulties in getting rid of the foreign troops were so fresh in their minds as to eclipse most of the other national issues. Today more than five years later the Katā'ib attitude toward Tap Line has changed little. They are not opposed to this form of economic imperialism, so long as it does not endanger Lebanon's national existance.(2) Actually they would welcome any foreign investments that would help bolster up the national economy. While insisting that Lebanon must develop an independent economic life, they realize fully that the size of the national budget cannot really support national industries at this time. Therefor, they look to foreign investments as a means to an end, hoping thatsuch developments will help solve the country's econmic problems and so strengthen Lebanese separatism. Furthermore it appears that they believe that American investments in the Lebanon are actually a sort of"invasion insurance". Assuming that the U.S. will seek to protect the investments of its citizen abroad, the Katā'ib reasons that the more U.S. investments in Lebanon, the safer she is from occupation by Russia in the event of a

(1) Action, August 9, 1946

(2) Interview with Pierre Gemayel, January 23, 1951.

major war between the East and West. If this reasoning is correct it is not all strange that the Katā'ib has viewed American investments in Lebanon as an advantage. Such an attitude is just the reverse of what most ultra-nationalists parties hold. Were Lebanon a large and powerful state, it is almost a certainty that the Katā'ib would be violently opposed to foreign investments. Their attitude toward French investments is the same except that their good will towards the French and the close cultural ties that exist between most members of the Katā'ib and France make such investments look even more beneficial. However, concessions of a monopolist nature excite the suspicions of the party. The Belgium-owned tram lines and the Beirut public utilities have been strongly criticized by the party. Public utilities, they feel, are the natural property of the state. Their attitude toward government ownership of the port of Beirut, at present largely in French hands, has been impossible to discover. However, if the party policies of the Katā'ib are consistent, we can assume that they would welcome government ownership of the port as well. They seem to have made a distinction between foreign investments in real property and foreign investments in public services; the former they welcome, the latter they tolerate but would like to see an end to them.

Party Attitude Toward Arab Unity

The "raison d'être" of the Katā'ib is the maintenance of Lebanese separatism and the strengthening of the myth of the Lebanese nation. Therefore any movement that tends to strengthen Arab unity either through federation or union of any part of the Arab world is viewed with alarm by the Katā'ib. Syro-Lebanese Union economic or political, the Arab League, Pan-Islam, Pan-Arabism, Syro-Iraqi union, Greater Syria and all the rest are terms that send cold shivers down the backs of the Katā'ib.

The party stresses the difference of the Lebanon and the Lebanese people from the rest of the Arab world. They use Lebanese nationalism as a foil to any of the union ideas of the Arabs.

The most immediate problem of this nature that the Katā'ib has had to face was the issues raised by the Arab League. The party saw the Arab League as a super-state that would trample in the dust the separatist aims of the Lebanon. The bases of this fear lie not so much in the actual loss of Lebanese independence, but in an overpowering fear of Islam. A fear that is the product not only of the Moslem attitude toward Christians, but of the Christian attitude toward Moslems. Islam theoretically can never really recognize the Christian community as its equal; to do so would be to disavow the teachings of the Koran, a thing that no devout Moslem can do, and a

thing that no Moslem government, regardless of how enlightened it may be, would dare attempt. The incident of the marriage of King Farouk's sister to a Copt turned Moslem in 1950, is a good indication of how deep rooted is the Moslem-Christian antagonism. The marriage in itself is of little importance, but the attitude of the King, his government and the Egyptian people, and the furor it raised, gives the Lebanese Christians another indication of what their position would be should Lebanon be ruled by a Moslem state.

Looking at the Moslem states, and particularly Egypt, increases the Katā'ib fears, for they see that Christians in any Moslem state, are really only second class citizens. The Katā'ib's approach to the problem of religion would resolve itself in a super-Lebanese nationalism. Their great hope is to create a state that "rejects all theocratic ideologies which in other countries are the basis of the constitution. "We stand for civil non-sectarian legislation ... and reject all canon law, Christian or Moslem".[1]

This is just one example of hundreds of statements made by responsible members of the Katā'ib on this problem of sectarianism. It is difficult to say that the party is insincere in this matter: rather it would be more objective to consider their stand on sectarianism as ambiguous. They would like to see the establishment of a non-religious state, but they are

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(1) Gemayel, p. 9.

not willing to pay the price. In the meantime such a stand as they have adopted is good public relations. They must realize fully that any de-sectarianization of the Lebanon would reduce the political strength of the Maronite clergy, which in turn would make Lebanon more amiable to proposals for a Greater Syria. Yet the two main talking points of the Katā'ib are maintenance of Lebanese separatism and a non-sectarian state. In the light of this it is easy to understand their attack on Azzam Pasha's[1] plan for a unified citizenship and an Arab Army,[2] and their insistence that the Arab League was merely an assembly of sovereign states meeting for the purpose of exchanging ideas. The special status of Lebanon as recognized by the League allayed these fears to some extent, however the party has maintained a watch-dog attitude toward all League activities. Once it became evident that the Arab League would never be strong enough to unite the Arab world politically the Katā'ib began to breath more comfortably and to take a milder view of the whole affair. Such statements as, "We wish to, and we will cooperate with the Arab League, but we will not compromise our independence, Cooperation oui, l'union jamais",[3] gives the reader an idea

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(1) Azzam Pasha is Secretary General of the Arab League.

(2) Gemayel, 174: <u>Action</u>, July 26, 1946.

(3) Speech by Gemayel, May 18, 1949.

of the present Katā'ib attitude toward the League. In regard to the proposed social program of the Arab League, the party is heartily in favour since they see in this a lessening of the political efforts of the League.(1)

While a serious problem to the Katā'ib, the Arab League is child's play when compared to the Syro-Lebanese problem. The greatest single danger to the aspirations of the Katā'ib is Syria. History and more particularly geography have made Lebanon a part of Syria, and this is an issue that the party has bent all its efforts to fight. At the root of the problem is their fear of Islam, and the recent controversy over Article 3 of the Syrian constitution has intensified it.(2) Furthermore, by constitutional law the Syrian President and all the legislators must work for Arab unity. This also has added to the fears of the Katā'ib. Union with Syria, they believe, would reduce the effective political power of the Christians to a point where their voice would scarcely be heard. Thus the Katā'ib has built up an elaborate system which they hope will maintain Lebanese independence. At the basis of this is

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(1) Any social or economic reforms effected by the Arab League will, in the long run, help unify the Arabs politically. Thus the Katā'ib is supporting a program which may one day destroy them.

(2) Article 3 states that the President must be a Moslem and that Islamic Jurisprudence shall be the principal source for legislation; although freedom of belief is safeguarded. M.F. Abcarius' tr. Constitution of the Syrian Republic. (Beirut, 1950).

their view of history and their insistence that Lebanese are not Arabs. They claim to be a 'nation', a nation with a continuous history and culture, and union with other nations does not interest them.[1] Any issue that appears to provide an opening wedge for Syro-Lebanese union is opposed by the party. As far back as 1939 they decried the Common Interests Regime of Syria and Lebanon, claiming that it was a surrender of Lebanese sovereignty and the first step toward political union. In 1944 they stated "The Common Interests Regime is a form of dictatorship and it tends to unite Syria and Lebanon, this is anti-Lebanese".[2] These attacks on the customs union were carried out year after year: 1945 - "An evil to be destroyed"; 1946:"Without economic independence there is no political independence", etc. etc. To the great relief of the Katā'ib the Common Interests Regime was dissolved in March of 1950. Since that time, less than a year after the rupture, the Katā'ib has changed its tune. Lebanon is now facing economic difficulties that appear solvable only with resumption of some sort of unified customs and economic system with Syria. While not wanting to admit this, the Katā'ib has had to find a new scape-goat for Lebanon's unemployment and economic ills. They now lay them at the feet of the Syrian boycott of Lebanese goods. Again pointing out that

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(1) Action, March 30, 1941.

(2) Action, February 8, 1944.

this is still another indication of Syrian bad faith in regard to the Lebanon. The Katā'ib now looks for a resumption of free trade with Syria but still opposes any customs union.[1] It appears that the Katā'ib has no workable solution for this problem. It is almost a case of being willing to risk the complete ruin of Lebanese economy, rather than join with Syria in any project that might militate against what the Katā'ib holds to be Lebanese sovereignty.

Syrianism as preached by Antoon Saadeh and his party, the P.P.S., were considered by the Katā'ib as its major adversary. The P.P.S. was a strong popular movement that found its most vocal opposition in the Katā'ib. Although the P.P.S. was, in fact, anti-Islamic in the sense that it tried to elevate Syrianism above the universality of Islam, and anti-Arab in that it wished to substitute Syrian nationalism for Arab nationalism, the Katā'ib feared that it would in time succumb to Islam. In addition to this, they believed that it was just another "British-inspired" attempt to rob the Lebanon of its status. In a sense, the P.P.S. was beneficial to the Katā'ib for as long as the Katā'ib had a very definite and present adversary, it maintained itself at a high peak of efficiency. Once the P.P.S. was broken, the Katā'ib began to rest on its laurels. While it has been impossible to get accurate membership lists, it is quite certain that the member-

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(1) Interview, Pierre Gemayel, December 22, 1950.

ship of the Katā'ib was greatest during the last struggle between these two parties. Once the P.P.S. was beaten many Katā'ib members began to lose enthusiasm for the party. An organization such as this seems to be strongest when on the defensive, and when faced with a very real and active opposition. The leaders of the Katā'ib are now at a loss for any visible foe within the Lebanon.

Any Pan-Arab movement, be it in the guise of a Greater Syria (Abdullah Plan) or a union of Jordan and Iraq, or, in any other form, will bring the Katā'ib into action. While not as close as Syro-Lebanese Union, such schemes are: nonetheless, feared by this party .... The protagonists of Lebanese separatism find Pan-Islamites and Pan-Arabs behind every tree. Completely denying their Arab heritage they speak in such terms as: "between the Arab countries and ourselves" or "we are not hostile to the Arabs..." "the Arab peoples owe us a great deal. Their renaissance is due to our ancestors..."(1)

This party does not associate the Lebanese with the Arabs; it believes that they are a nation apart. The reason for this is religion - fear of Islam. Therefore the Katā'ib refuses to accept the common denominator of Arab. In all fairness to this point of view one must say, when looking around the Arab world, that the Arab Christians have a legitimate reason to fear Islam. But the point is that separatism,

(1) Gemayel, p. 113.

Lebanese or otherwise, is not the solution to the problem of the Christian minorities in the Arab world.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL GROUPS IN THE KATĀ'IB

The membership of the Katā'ib is made up of professional people, white-collar workers and small landholders. It should therefore, be considered a middle class movement. Leadership of the party is completely in the hands of professional people, and, with few outstanding exceptions, most of the party leaders are lawyers. Except for Pierre Gemayel, none of these men could be considered to be wealthy, and even Gemayel is not to be compared with the really wealthy Lebanese. Geographically the party strongholds are Beirut and the Maronite districts of Mount Lebanon. South Lebanon, which is largely Shī'ite Moslem, contributes practically no members to the organization. However, party membership is not exclusively Maronite and Uniate, inasmuch as there is a good sprinkling of Orthodox and very few Jews, and, according to one report, 40 Sunni Moslems. For practical purposes, we should consider the party as a Maronite movement. While no party regulation prevents non-Christians from membership, and even though, the party would like to be considered non-sectarian, the underlying philosophy and the general political program of the Katā'ib make it distasteful to Moslems, Druzes and non-Maronite Christians. Official figures concerning religious affiliation of Katā'ib members, have been impossible to obtain, yet the

fact that the party cells are most numerous in Maronite villages and in the Christian quarters of Beirut is a good indication of where party strength lies. It is the opinion of almost every politically informed Lebanese that the Katā'ib is more than 95% Maronite and Uniate.

Biographies of Katā'ib Leaders

Shaikh Pierre Gemayel (President of the Party)

Born: Bikeayyah, Lebanon, 1905.

Religion: Maronite

Profession: Pharmacist.

Father's Occupation: Physician

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

Joseph Chader (Secretary General)

Born:

Religion: Armenian Catholic

Profession: Lawyer

Father's Occupation: Merchant

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

Elias Rababy (Head of the Propaganda and Press)

Born: Djidita, Lebanon

Religion: Greek Catholic

Profession: Newspaper Editor

Father's Occupation: Farmer

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

Laure Nasr (Director of the Women's Group)

Born: Jezzein, Lebanon, 1922

Religion: Maronite

Profession: Lawyer

Father's Occupation: Farmer

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

Abdo Saab (Director of Finance)

Born: Hammana, Lebanon, 1913

Religion: Maronite

Profession: Banker - Bank of Syria and Lebanon

Father's Occupation: Farmer

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

Obeid Issa (Assistant Director of Social Affairs)

Born: Zahley, Lebanon, 1924

Religion: Greek Catholic

Profession: Lawyer

Father's Occupation: Lawyer

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

Joseph Mougaizel (Assistant Director of Youth)

Born: Beirut, Lebanon 1926

Religion: Greek Catholic

Profession: Lawyer

Father's Occupation: Physician

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

<u>Jacques Chadid</u> (Director of Social Affairs)

Born: Idde, Lebanon 1911

Religion: Maronite

Profession: Civil Servant

Father's Occupation: Farmer

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

<u>Elie Touma</u> (Director of Emigration and Imigration)

Born: Deir Al Kamar, Lebanon, 1911

Religion: Maronite

Profession: Lawyer

Father's Occupation: Merchant

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

<u>Joseph Saadeh</u> (Director of Discipline)

Born: Bourj el Bourajne, Lebanon

Religion: Maronite

Profession: Lawyer

Father's Occupation: Merchant

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

<u>Daher Matar</u> (Provincial Director)

Born: Jounie, Lebanon, 1921

Religion: Maronite

Profession: Physician

Father's Occupation: Merchant

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

<u>Antoine Jazzar</u> (Provincial Director for Beirut)

Born: Tripoli, Lebanon 1921

Religion: Maronite

Profession: Lawyer

Father's Occupation: Merchant

Education: St. Joseph's University, Beirut.

CHAPTER VIII

RELATIONSHIP TO THE POWERS

Toward Great Britain

The Katā'ib inherited from France an abiding distrust of Great Britain and her not unfavorable attitude toward Arab Unity. The party thinks of Britain as being behind every move towards Arab unity and feels certain that her influence in the Arab World is an instrument for the destruction of Lebanese separatism. Active dislike of the English goes back as far as 1860 when the British supported the Druzes against the Maronites. Such a long standing antagonism, backed up by history as well, is a powerful factor in any British-Katā'ib relationship. One of the reasons why the party feared the Arab League was that they thought it was a means for the extension of British influence in the Arab East. Such statement as

> "At the bottom of the question we must realize that the League is the child of Great Britain"(1)

appeared daily in the party press during the summer of 1946. The Katā'ib is quite willing to lay all the political ills of the country squarely at the feet of Great Britain. It must be remembered that all of the leaders of the party are Anglophobes, and they in turn formulate party policy. Arab unity,

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(1) Action, July 26, 1946.

itself a danger to the party, is looked upon as a means for Great Britain to reestablish her influence throughout the entire Near East. They believed that the proposed Syrian-Iraqi union meant an extension of British control over Syria. As for the Hashemite plans for a personal union of Iraq and Jordan, they believe this will mean an extension of Britain's quasi-Jordanian mandate over Iraq.

Toward France

At the other extreme, the Katā'ib, while not a French tool, is a firm friend of the French. All of the party leaders have received their education from the French, and most of them, in daily intercourse, speak French in preference to Arabic. The President of the Party, Pierre Gemayel, seldom writes in Arabic, and consequently, his articles and speeches have to be translated for him. The editor of "Action" and "Al'Amal", Elias Rababy, is in daily contact with the French Military Attaché, and it is likely that he is a paid agent of the French. This is of extreme importance since the party newspapers have a large circulation among party members and are, no doubt, an important source of information for them. All of the leaders of the party and most of the members have been nurtured in French culture and political philosophy. The Katā'ib's organization and temper bare an unmistakable French hall-mark. However, while their friendship with France

is firm, the party does not officially favor a re-establishment of the mandate. As early as 1943 they stated:

> "We believe that Franco-Lebanese friendship is beneficial to our country, but we do not admit that France's mission in Lebanon is one of colonization".(1)

Even during the dark days after the fall of France before the Nazi onslaught, this party could and did remain loyal to their mentor. "France", they said, "will not fail in her mission and Lebanon will never give up her loyal cooperation".(2) In 1945, at the height of the troubles caused by the proposed Franco-Lebanese alliance, they stood firm in their belief in the benefits which would accrue from Franco-Lebanese cooperation, although they repudiated the treaty in the form in which it was presented,(3) because they believed that it was immicial to Lebanese sovereignty. To understand the party's attitude toward France we must keep in mind that, while the Katā'ib is opposed to direct French political control, she welcomes French culture, aid, and the protection France can provide against a possible Moslem resurgence. This attachment to France goes far back into history; its seeds were sown during the Crusades, and it bloomed during the 1840 and 1860 Druze-Christian wars when France came to the assistance of the

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(1) Gemayel, p. 125.

(2) *Action*, January 2, 1941.

(3) *Ibid*, June 15, 1945.

Maronites. France has always maintained a benevolent attitude toward the Christians of Mount Lebanon, and one could not expect that her attitude toward a Christian Maronite political party would be any different. It is quite natural that the Christians, and especially the Maronites, should look to France as their protectors. It is also quite natural, at this later stage of political development, that the Katā'ib, as one of the political parties that carries on the traditions of a Christian Lebanon, should look to France as her friend and protector. Regardless of what the party press may have said about various French administrators sent to Lebanon during the Mandate, or about certain French policies, the fact that France inaugurated what the Katā'ib is now trying to preserve precoocludes anything but real Katā'ib-French friendship. We must not forget that the preservation of "Grand Liban", as constituted by the French, is the reason d'être of the Katā'ib. The long association of the Maronites and the French, strengthened by two centuries of French missionary and educational work, has forged a bond between the two groups which will not be broken easily. The Katā'ib as one of the heirs to this tradition could never be expected to be anything but pro-French.

Towards Russia

The group's attitude towards Soviet Russia is typical

of what might be expected from a Christian, capitalist and nationalist organization. They fear and distrust Russia and her international communist organization, and they are well aware that cooperation with the Communists would mean an end to their own political life. The very philosophy of the Katā'ib is diametrically opposed to that of the Communists. The nationalist doctrine as taught by the Katā'ib would be branded by the Soviets as a form of 19th century capitalism. Most of the party members are communicants of the Maronite or Uniate Churches and are under the religious discipline of Rome, which has declared the Communists to be anti-Christian. The greatest danger to the party lies in the possible dissafection of members to Communism. Most of the Katā'ib members are literate and politically conscious. The party itself has intensified their political consciousness and has led them to believe that Lebanese nationalism and the Katā'ib system are capable of transforming the country into a paradise. Should the members of the party become sufficiently dissalutioned with the conditions in the country or with the Katā'ib's ability to cope with the problems, it is quite probable that they would turn to communism. Another great danger is that the party can be used by the Communists as an instrument to create confusion and riots, and should the situation become critical enough, the Communists could emerge the victors. This party has already

been used by the Communists as a front for their activities. This was done without the consent or even the knowledge of the Katā'ib. In February 1951, a Katā'ib sponsored movement for aid to Lebanese students studying in the universities was seized upon by the Communists as fuel for their attacks on the Lebanese government and the American University of Beirut. The strikers demanded financial assistance and the establishment of a National University, both of which were promised by the government. However, before the issue had been settled, the Communists joined the fray and distributed hand bills at the American University attacking both the government and the University administration. Another example of this was the P.P.S.-Katā'ib affair in May of 1949, when the Communists were able through the Kata'ib to assist in the destruction of the P.P.S.

Towards the U.S.A.

The attitude of the Katā'ib towards the United States is colored by two factors: their belief that the United States favors Lebanese separatism and their dislike for the "Arab influence" of the American University. They count on the good will of the large number of Lebanese who have settled in the United States and the bond that such emigration has created between the two countries. They reason further that the United States policy of maintaining the status-quo will

assure the continuation of Lebanese independence. Since the American government has never publicly supported any pan-Arab movement, they feel certain that they can depend on her for support should the rest of the Arab world attempt to exert pressure on Lebanon to enter an Arab union. They reason further that the force of public opinion in America and the bad press that Moslem pressure on Lebanon would create are sufficient to force the American government into upholding Lebanese separatism. The recent efforts of Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister in Washington and Representative to the United Nations, which has brought Lebanon more and more into the press, have pleased the party leaders. In fact, the Katā'ib has been considering offering Dr. Malik honorary membership in the party. The average American's ignorance of Islam and his naive belief that Moslems, (Mohammedans, as he would probably call them) are heathen, plus the sympathy that any persecution of Christians or the appearance of such would cause, no doubt would be sufficient to attract American attention. It is the hope of the Katā'ib, therefore that the United States will pick up the mantal of France in regard to Lebanon, but divested of any desire to take active political control of the country. One of the reasons why the group has favoured American private investments in Lebanon is their belief that, if the United States' economic stake is large enough, she will have to adopt a protective policy as regards

the status of Lebanon. At the same time they are confused and frightened by what they like to refer to as the "Arab influence" of the American University of Beirut. Not fully understanding the University's non-governmental private status, they confuse her policies and activities with those of the American government and read into them an official policy of that government.

CHAPTER IX

THE KATĀ'IB, FASCIST OR NOT

Like almost all political parties founded in the Arab World during the 1930'ies, the Katā'ib was influenced by the political scene in Europe. Europe at this time was undergoing what we shall call the Fascist revolution. Italian fascism was well established and flexing its muscles, while German Nazism was fast becoming a menace. Fascism's order and leadership based on an exagerated form of nationalism appealed to the Arab mind. In addition to this, and this was not well understood by all the Arab political leaders, Fascism subordinated the individual to the state to a point where individual rights existed only so long as they did not come into conflict with the State. In the Fascist community the capacity of the people was organized with view, not to the needs of the individual, but for the well being of the Super-State. The State and the fascist party were fused so that it was difficult to tell which was which:

> "This expedient of 'personal union' between party and state allows the penetration of the state by the National Socialist spirit and prevents the professional state bureaucracy from entrenching itself in the civil service against party influence".(1)

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(1) J. Shotwell, R.K. Gooch, K. Loewenstein, A. Zurcher, M. Florensky, N. Herlitz & J. Wuorinen, Governments of Continental Europe. (N.Y.C., 1940), Vol. I, p. 474.

National symbolism was another indispensable part of the Fascist system. In Nazi Germany, for example, vilification of the flag or defamation of national symbols were punishable acts. Uniformed military cadres, badges and other symbolic paraphenalia were everywhere present. Organized mass demonstrations, festivals, and special distinctive salutes became a necessary part of the system. A "Fuhrer" complex was an absolute essential for the Fascist state which had to be able to keep the people in a continual state of incessant emotionalism. This is hardly a fair summary of Fascism, but it will give us a vantage point from which to view the Katā'ib.

Does the Katā'ib propose to create a state such as outlined above? The answer to this cannot be an absolute affirmative or negative, the answer lies in a contradiction. The paraphenalia of Fascism is everywhere present in the party, but the leadership and their will to power are not strong enough to create a totalitarian system. The Katā'ib has since its founding tried to build up a system of national symbols; everywhere in the Christian mountain villages and in Beirut one can see their propaganda, "The Katā'ib in the Service of Lebanon". Their party literature tries to glorify service to the state, making it an almost religious duty. With the zeal of converts, the new party members pledge their lives to the service of their country and the Katā'ib. Party mass meetings use the same tactics that Hitler and Mussolini

found so successful. However, the tremendous fanaticism seen in Germany is not present at the Katā'ib gatherings. The type of leadership necessary for a real Fascistic state is not as yet evident in the Katā'ib; although Pierre Gemayel is highly respected, and while the Katā'ib has tried to build up the "Fuhrer" complex in regard to him they have largely failed. Party propaganda likes to refer to Gemayel with such phrases as: "Leader of his people, Savious of our National honor; Pierre, our beloved Chief, He who will drive the Pharisees from the Temple of Government". While such terms of respect may be attributed to the richness and beauty of the Arabic tongue, they also underlie a definite attempt to make the president of the party a symbol of the nation. Such a personalized national symbol is one of the tactics used by the Fascists. The real national symbol of the party is the Cedar of Lebanon. This along with the national flag are accorded honors far beyond what one would normally expect. Another common feature of the Katā'ib and Fascism is that both have uniformed armed guards which can be called upon to as political shock troops in any sort of demonstration. Organized mass meetings are, by statute, a part of the party organization and program, and the Katā'ib leaders have always been careful to hold such affairs when and where they are apt to attract the most attention and where they will be most effective in propagating the party philosophy. It is

quite evident, therefore, that the theory (and certainly the paraphenalia of Fascism) is present in this party, but its leadership lacks the essential discipline and will to power that characterized most of the great Fascist leaders of the 30's. Furthermore they have never advocated one party rule, although most of the successful Fascist parties did not do so either until after they had come to power. Fascism in practice has been rule by industralists and 'political philosophers', this was true in both Germany and Italy: it would be difficult to concieve of the Katā'ib being able to convince the few Lebanese industralists and the wealthy merchants of the necessity of totalitarian rule by the Katā'ib. While they preach service to the Fatherland and the sacrifice of the individual for the good of the State, they do so more in the manner of oratory than out of conviction. Just what they mean by 'service and sacrifice' is hard to determine.

Herein lies one of the distinguishing features of the Katā'ib, it is a party of contradictions. Its program and activities appear to be Fascist even its method of operation bares it a strong resemblance. Some of the younger and more radical members would like to see the party develop more along the lines of National Socialism, but it cannot. The party cannot because it lacks the necessary leadership, the blind devotion of its members and ideal sufficiently colorful and mystic to create in its followers the will to sacrifice

their all for party and State. While it applaudes, approves and uses the tools of Fascism, its underlying philosophy is that of the French revolution. The French and the Fascist revolutions are separated in time by 2 1/2 centuries and are antipathetical. The Kata'ib's leaders its influential, and even the common run of members have all been trained in the French tradition and they accept, without thinking, the results of the French revolution. With such a background it is hard to believe that the Katā'ib could ever become consistently Fascistic.

Furthermore, the Arab Mind, and in particular the Levantine mind, could not long endure the thought control necessary to Fascism. An Arab can be, and has been, for centuries ruled by superior forces, but he is an unreconstructed individualist, and his inner being rebels against Fascism, no matter how attractive its program may seem to him. This is of course a contradiction in the character of the Arab; a contradiction that appears in his political thinking and is seen in the Katā'ib. The Katā'ib has made a witches brew of these two widely separated schools of thought. The Lebanon has nothing to fear from the Katā'ib as regards a real Fascist revolution.

The position of the Katā'ib in relation to the present government is symbolic of the general contradiction of the party itself. It is at the same time in favour of and

violently opposed to the government. Basically there is not a great difference between them. The Katā'ib has a more progressive program, on paper at any rate. Their disagreement with the government is not one of doctrine, but rather of practice. The government party and the Katā'ib agree on the issue of class, since both of them are basically capitalistic. The dispute resolves its self into the belief that they, the Katā'ib, can do better more efficiently, more honestly, the things that the present government would like to do, but never seems to accomplish. This party is not a revolutionary movement, it is not even, in the light of modern economics, a very progressive one. It is if anything, a reform party and its reforms would not be calculated to disturb to greatly the present social and economic structures.

The greatest difference between the Katā'ib and the Constitutional Bloc is that the former is an avowed Lebanese separatist group, whereas the later is separatist only because it seems to be the best policy at the moment and because of the vested interests that the members of the government have in Lebanon. The Katā'ib is the continuation of a tradition that goes back far into the history of Mt. Lebanon and what they propose is nothing more than an old idea reclothed in modern political dress. It is a 20th century attempt to maintain Lebanon as a refuge for oppressed groups and more particularly for the Christian minority in the Arab World.

Persecution of Christians by Moslems is greatly exaggerated and has become a sort of boggy-man, yet the fear that such a persecution complex creates inhances the position of a separatist party such as the Katā'ib.

This party will never have a determining effect on Lebanese political life until it captures the leadership of the Maronites which is now divided between them and the National Bloc. The capture of such leadership will never be possible until the Katā'ib publically declares itself to be a Maronite party.

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
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
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APPENDIX I



GENERAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

APPENDIX II



REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE KATĀ'IB